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P ralin e Look matey (picks up parrot) this parrot wouldn’t 
voom if  I put four thousand volts through it. It’s 
bleeding demised.
S h o p k eep er
P ra lin e
S h o p k eep er  
Praline (to camera)
S h o p k eep er
It’s not, it’s pining.
It’s not pining, it’s passed on. This parrot is no 
more. It has ceased to be. It’s expired and gone to 
meet its maker. This is a late parrot. It’s a stiff. 
Bereft of life, it rests in peace. If you hadn’t nailed it 
to the perch, it would be pushing up the daisies. It’s 
rung down the curtain and joined the choir invisible. 
This is an ex-parrot.
Well, I’d better replace it then.
If you want to get anything done in this country 
you’ve got to complain until you’re blue in the 
mouth.
Sorry guv, w e’re right out of parrots.
Monty Python’s Flying Circus: Just the Words. (1982) London: Mandarin 
Paperbacks.
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SUMMARY
This thesis assesses the diachronic development of the semantic field 
‘Death’ in English, focusing on synonyms for death and die. It begins 
with a discussion of the structuralist approach to meaning, from 
which developed the theory that the vocabulary of a language is 
structured by semantic fields which cover the conceptual areas 
belonging to the speakers of that language. A vocabulary is also a 
system, comprised of elements which might be related in any of a 
variety of ways. A change in one of the elements will affect those 
elements most closely related to it. The types of change undergone by 
any section of the vocabulary are discussed, with particular reference 
to the operation of change in areas perceived to be taboo and, 
specifically, in the language surrounding the concept ‘death’. Special 
attention is given to the ways in which metaphor has been utilised 
through time to discuss death, and particularly to the operation of 
euphemism and dysphemism, dominant forces in this area of the 
vocabulary.
This thesis holds that language is not only a system with inbuilt 
strategies for change, but also a social phenomenon, conditioned by 
our perception of the world. It includes, therefore, a discussion of 
the history of perceptions of death in the west for the period in which 
English has been spoken, in order to assess the extent to which 
correlations can be found between changing perceptions of death and 
changes in the language with which it has been discussed.
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INTRODUCTION
It is my aim in this thesis to assess the development of the semantic 
field ‘Death’ in English, and suggest reasons for particular changes 
which have taken place within it. This investigation will, necessarily, 
be limited in a number of ways. For example, I will look only at 
synonyms for ‘death’ and ‘die’ in detail and trace the historical 
development of only three lexical items from the field. It is believed, 
however, that many of the observations made throughout will be 
applicable not only to the entire semantic field ‘Death’, but to any 
field of the vocabulary. Factors which differentiate this particular 
semantic field from any other will also form a part of the study. The 
field ‘Death’, like all semantic fields, has its own unique structure 
owing to the perception of death as an entity different from every 
other, as well as the apparent randomness with which the elements of 
any field will interract.
I chose the semantic field ‘Death’ for a number of reasons, some of 
which were simply practical. For example, the material comprising 
the field had already been classified by the Historical Thesaurus1, 
currently in production. The field is relatively small and self- 
contained, by which I mean that there is little overlapping of the 
meanings within it with those of other fields2. Another factor which 
prompted the choice of this field was that it covers a conceptual area 
which is felt to be interesting for the following reasons. The concept 
‘death’ is relatively abstract and we can therefore assume that the 
language used to discuss it will be shaped more by psychological 
factors than that surrounding a more concrete concept. Moreover, 
the emotions surrounding this concept are extremely complex, 
perhaps more so than those aroused by any other single concept. 
Finally, it is widely believed (see ch. 4) that attitudes towards death 
altered throughout and since the medieval period. The complex and 
changing perception of death, I hope to show, is to some extent
1 The Historical Thesaurus o f English. Research project in preparation, 
Department of English Language, University of Glasgow.
2A reason for the ‘self-contained’ nature of the field is suggested on
p .120.
viii
reflected in the language.
This thesis is based largely on material extrapolated from the Oxford 
English Dictionary (O.E.D) and the Historical Thesaurus o f English 
(Historical Thesaurus). The following section is intended as a brief 
introduction to the Historical Thesaurus, the production of which is in 
progress in the English Language Department of the University of 
Glasgow, under the directorship of Christian Kay. The Historical 
Thesaurus, initiated in 1964 by Professor Michael Samuels and now 
nearing completion, is the first historical thesaurus to be compiled for 
any language, and will include almost the entire vocabulary of 
English throughout its history. It treats comprehensively, not only 
contemporary English words, but also obsolete words and obsolete 
meanings of current words, thereby enabling the study of a particular 
area of the language through time.
The classification of words in the Thesaurus is based on three major 
divisions: (I) The World (which includes the semantic field ‘Death’); 
(II) The Mind, covering man's mental activities; and (III) Society, 
which deals with social structures and artefacts. Within these major 
divisions the material is arranged in hierarchical categories, each 
consisting of a defining heading followed by chronological lists of all 
the words, along with their dates of currency, which have ever been 
used as synonyms or near synonyms for the definition. It utilises in 
its classification system structuralist linguistic theory, discussed in 
chapter 1, displaying the different ways in which meanings of words 
are connected.
The diagram on p.xi provides a basic guide to the classification 
system of the Historical Thesaurus and indicates the position within it 
of the semantic field ‘Death’, a sample of which is included. The 
numbers correspond to semantic relationships, e.g. the grim reaper 
(subgroup 03) is perceived to be less general in meaning than 
deadness (subgroup 01), but the meaning of both is ‘included’ in the 
meaning of death, which is therefore assigned a group number as
opposed to a subgroup number. The semantic relationship of 
‘inclusion' is known as hyponymy, defined by Lyons (1977:291) as:
...the relation which holds between a more specific, or subordinate, 
lexeme and a more general, or superordinate, lexeme, as 
exemplified by such pairs as ‘cow’:’animal', ‘rose’:'flower',...
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The methodology adopted in this thesis is as follows. We begin with a 
general discussion of the structuralist theory of meaning which 
provides the theoretical basis for the study. We will proceed to 
examine the operation and direction of semantic change, including 
metaphor and euphemism, within the semantic field ‘Death’. This 
will be followed by a detailed examination of the metaphorical 
content of the field. We will then trace the history of three lexical 
items whose development is believed to illustrate features typical of 
the field. Finally, I will present a brief overview of the changes 
undergone by perceptions of death throughout the history of the 
English Language, and will assess the extent to which correlations can 
be found between the conceptual area ‘death’ and the semantic field 
used to discuss it. The relevance of material dealing with thought 
rather than language to this thesis lies in the fact that language is not 
only an interdependent system but also a social phenomenon, shaped 
not only by forces from within the language itself but also by the 
relationship of speakers to each other and to their world. For this 
reason, any robust theory of language should address the interaction 
of both intralinguistic and extralinguistic processes.
Chapter 1
STRUCTURAL LINGUISTICS
A language is a system in which everything holds together1
This first chapter provides a description of the structuralist approach 
to lexical meaning, and is intended to provide a theoretical foundation 
for our examination of the semantic field ‘Death’. In it we trace the 
development of field theory, and describe the methodological 
approaches which have made its development possible.
Since Saussure (1960, first published 1931), the commonly held 
theory of meaning amongst linguists has been that the vocabulary of a 
language is a system in which the meaning of any single word, as an 
element of the system, is connected to the meanings of other words, 
and that any change in the meaning of a single word will have an 
impact of some kind on the meanings related to it. This realisation 
that the vocabulary of a language is a structured system has been a 
vital breakthrough in linguistics and has enabled linguists of the latter 
half of the 20th century to reach a fuller understanding of the life of a 
vocabulary.
Earlier theories of meaning tend to be atomistic; the word and its 
meaning were considered in isolation, rather than as part of a system. 
A notable example is the ‘mechanistic’ or ‘descriptive’ linguistics of 
Leonard Bloomfield (1935) in which lexical meaning is envisaged as a 
causal sequence whereby an utterance gives rise to activity of some 
kind in the mind of the hearer (1935:139):
We have defined the meaning of a linguistic form as the 
situation in which the speaker utters it and the response which it 
calls forth in the hearer.[...] Speaker’s situation speech -> 
hearer’s response.
1 M eillet, Antoine, cit. Waldron (1967:96)
1
This highly empirical approach, whereby lexical meaning could be 
explained only through observation of speaker’s choice of and 
hearer’s response to language, has been widely criticised by structural 
linguists. Uriel Weinreich (1963:153), for example, objects to 
Bloomfield’s ‘misguided positivism’ which entails that progress in the 
field of linguistics depends on scientific discoveries which may never 
be made. It would necessitate, for example, understanding the 
processes of the human brain in order to explain the processes of 
linguistic selection. His approach is certainly flawed in its failure to 
account for the connectedness of language, and, in particular, the 
ways in which meanings are related. His most significant contribution 
lies in his account of semantic change, described in chapter 2.
Saussure (1960) concentrated in his lectures on the grammatical and 
phonemic, rather than on the semantic structure of language, but 
clearly believed language to be structured at all levels, with each level 
having its own internal structure and the potential to affect the 
structure of the other levels. Writers such as Baldinger (1980),
Lyons (1977, Language and Linguistics, 1981 and Language, Meaning 
and Context, 1981), Samuels (1972), Ullmann (1957, 1962), Waldron 
(1967), Weinreich (1963) and Weinreich, Labov and Herzog (1968), 
follow Saussure in viewing language as a system of related elements. 
Lyons (1977:231) provides the following explanation:
...every language is a unique relational structure, or system, 
and [... ] the units which we identify, or postulate as theoretical 
constructs, in analysing the sentence of a particular language 
(sounds, words, meanings, etc.) derive their essence and their 
existence from their relationships with other units in the same 
language system. We cannot first identify the units and then, at 
a subsequent stage of the analysis enquire what combinatorial 
or other relations hold between them: we simultaneously 
identify both the units and their interrelations. Linguistic units 
are points in a system, or network, of relations; they are the 
terminals of these relations, and they have no prior and 
independent existence.
2
Lexical meaning
The ‘linguistic unit’ of the vocabulary with which we are concerned 
in this thesis is the lexeme - the smallest unit in the structure which 
carries ‘significant’ or lexical meaning; dying is a lexeme, whereas 
-ing, which carries only grammatical meaning, is not a lexeme but a 
‘morpheme’. Saussure (1960:66) identified two elements which 
constitute the lexeme - the signifie (concept or ‘mental object’) and 
the signifiant (spoken word or ‘acoustic image’).
Post-Saussurean writers, including Ullmann (1957, 1962) and 
Baldinger (1980), have been concerned with exploring the 
relationship between these elements of the lexeme. Baldinger, 
following Ullmann and Heger (1970) amongst others, envisaged the 
relationship between the elements of lexical meaning as analogous to 
that between the parts of a triangle, as described in figure 1.2. The 
dotted line in the diagram represents the absence of a direct 
relationship between the real world and the signifiant; the existence of 
the different languages of the world, despite the similarities of human 
experience, suggests that this is the case.
3
signifie/
concept
signifiant/ reality/
accoustic image/ thing
name
Figure 1.2 Ullmann's triangle
Waldron (1967:76-77) criticises contemporary semanticists for being 
over-cautious with regard to hypostatization  or ‘verbal realism’ - 
the belief in the existence of abstract entities which are meanings of 
words forming a bond between words (or signifiants) and the things 
in reality that they name. According to him, the danger in denying 
the existence of hypostatization in language is that it can result in 
denial of much of what we can actually observe within language; we 
create linguistic categories, for example, in order to organize our 
experience of things in the world (1967:77):
It may still be asserted that individual lexical items function as 
elements in a generalizing or classifying system, whereby we 
assign portions and aspects of our experience to categories 
which are recognized by people who have learnt our language.
The existence of these categories, that of ‘colours’ for example, 
suggests that we perceive similarities between things in the world and 
the language we use to talk about them. But this is not to say that the 
relationship between language and the world is purely referential. 
There is a referential element to language, Waldron argues (1967:77), 
but it is only one type of relationship amongst the many and complex 
types which exist. For Waldron the link between the signifiant and 
the thing in the real world does not entail the existence of things
4
beyond language; the referential relationship is not to be understood 
simply as ‘name to bearer-of-name’, but as a more more complex 
connection, arising from the way in which we categorise the world. 
The language we use should not be taken as an indication of how 
things really are, but of how we perceive things to be, and our 
perception will often depend on cultural and environmental factors.
He writes (1967:114):
...lexical meaning rests not upon a natural bond between word 
and sense, nor even (in any literal way) upon a convention or 
law, but upon something more indeterminate still - upon 
custom.
Baldinger was interested in onomasiology - that branch of semantics 
which starts from the concept or ‘mental object’ in the mind of the 
speaker to examine all the signifiants or ‘designations’ that the speaker 
might choose to express it. In this thesis we are dealing with the 
concepts of ‘death’ and ‘dying’ and the designations which have been 
used throughout the history of English to express these concepts. The 
designations can be understood as forming a ‘field of designations’ - a 
network in which the connections between the concept and all of its 
designations would be apparent, were it possible to make a study of 
the development of each lexeme in the field.
'death' (concept/signifie)
decease
(des ignation /
sign ifiant)
death
(des ignation/
signifiant)
demise
(des ign atio n /
signifiant)
Figure 1.3 Part of the 'field of designations
5
Development of field theory
This thesis will examine the developments which have taken place in a 
single semantic field in English - that of ‘Death’ - but many of the 
observations will be relevant to the structure of a vocabulary in 
general. A central aspect of structuralist semantic theory is the 
recognition that the vocabulary of a language is comprised of 
sem antic fields - a term thought to have been introduced by Ipsen 
(1924). A semantic field is a closely-knit section of the vocabulary, 
which lexicalizes and organises a particular conceptual area, for 
example, that of ‘death and dying’ with which we are particularly 
concerned here.
Field-theory - a development of post-Saussurean structuralist thought 
- was initially advanced most notably by the prominent German and 
Swiss scholars of the '20s and '30s, including Ipsen (1924), Porzig 
(1950) and Trier (1973). Trier's version is generally thought to be 
of greatest value although flawed in a number of ways. There now 
follows a brief review of Trier’s approach and the revisions to it 
provided by succeeding writers, as a means of elucidating the 
development of modern field-theory. Trier's work has been 
evaluated by writers including Lyons (1977), and I will refer to his 
observations throughout this section.
Trier recognised that one of the major failings of traditional 
diachronic semantics was that it set out to catalogue the history of 
changes in the meanings of individual lexemes atomistically, instead 
of investigating changes in the whole structure of the vocabulary as it 
develops through time. He was aware that a change in the meaning of 
a single linguistic item has an effect on those items which are most 
closely related to it in meaning or form.
6
D iach ro n ic /sy n ch ro n ic  m ethodology
During the 19th century, scholars in a variety of disciplines, including 
linguistics, started to make use of new methods inspired by Darwinian 
discoveries. Most at this time were interested only in evolutionary 
investigation which focused on historical or d iachronic 
development. It came to be seen as necessary to supplement this 
method of linguistic study with an approach which would allow the 
elements in a language at a given point in time to be studied as a 
whole, that is, to supplement diachronic investigation with a 
synchronic perspective.
Saussure (1960) first distinguished between the diachronic and 
synchronic investigation of languages; two distinct but equally 
legitimate approaches to linguistic study. Lyons (1977:243) provides 
the following definition:
By the synchronic analysis of a language is meant the 
investigation of the language as it is, or was, at a certain time; 
by the diachronic analysis of a language is to be understood the 
study of changes in the language between two given points in 
time.
The interdependence of the two methods is apparent in the fact that 
diachronic linguistics presupposes and depends on synchronic 
linguistics, as Lyons (1977:252) observes:
...the notion of one language (e.g. English) existing over the 
centuries (from the time of Shakespeare to the present day, 
shall we say) is fallacious. What we have underlying the 
language-behaviour of people living at different periods are 
distinct language-systems; each of these systems can be studied, 
synchronically, independently of the other; and diachronic 
linguistics can investigate how an earlier system was 
transformed into a later system.
7
Trier (1973) recognised the need for a synchronic approach to 
semantic investigation, since the diachronic development of a 
vocabulary is comprised of successive systems of interrelated 
elements. He viewed the vocabulary of a language as an integrated 
system of lexemes (i.e. as a structure), interrelated in sense and in 
constant flux; so that not only do we find previously existing lexemes 
disappearing and new lexemes coming into being throughout the 
history of a language, but the relations of sense which hold between a 
given lexeme and a neighbouring lexeme in the system are constantly 
changing. Any broadening in the sense of one lexeme is seen to 
involve a corresponding narrowing in the sense of one or more of its 
neighbours.
Trier (1973) conducted a study into the conceptual field ‘knowledge’, 
as structured by the vocabulary of Middle High German, from the 
beginning to the end of the thirteenth century. The meaning of 
‘conceptual field’ and ‘lexical field’ as envisaged by Trier is 
elucidated by Lyons (1977:254) as follows:
The set of lexemes in any one language-system which cover the 
conceptual area and, by means of the relations of sense which 
hold between them, give structure to it is a lexical field 
(Wortfeld); and each lexeme will cover a certain conceptual 
area, which may in turn be structured as a field by another set 
of lexemes (as the area covered by "red" in English is 
structured by "scarlet", "crimson", "vermillion", etc.). The 
sense of a lexeme is therefore a conceptual area within a 
conceptual field; and any conceptual area that is associated with 
a lexeme, as its sense, is a concept.
‘Semantic field’ is the more usual term for ‘lexical field’ today, and 
will, therefore, be used throughout this thesis.
Trier’s method was to compare the structure of the semantic field 
‘knowledge’ at time t1 with the structure of the semantic field
8
‘knowledge’ at time t2. As Lyons (1977:243) suggests, strict 
application of the diachronic/synchronic distinction raises the 
following question: on what grounds can we say that the semantic 
field we would call ‘knowledge’ at one point in time is sufficiently 
similar to the semantic field called ‘knowledge’ at a different point in 
time to allow comparison? He provides the answer (1977:252):
They are comparable because, although they are different 
lexical fields (and necessarily so, since they belong to different 
synchronic language-systems), they cover the same conceptual 
field.
His aim was to show how the meaning of one lexical item in a lexical 
set (a subgroup of a semantic field, such as lexemes meaning ‘red’ in 
the field ‘colours’) is limited by the meaning of its neighbours and 
how a change of meaning in one lexeme automatically brings about 
certain changes in the meaning of other words in the set. In figure 
1.4, the widening in the meaning of form a from ‘pq’ to ‘pqx’ from 
time t 1 to t2 results in a corresponding narrowing in the meaning of b 
from ‘xy’ to ‘y ’ from time t3 to t4.
Figure 1. 4 Diachronic change
This recognition of the effect on neighbouring items of a change in a 
single lexeme and the central role of this relationship in semantic 
investigation was a considerable breakthrough, and paved the way for 
modern field-theory. There were, however, a number of flaws in
9
Trier's approach which have since been identified and resolved by 
other writers.
P arad ig m atic /sy n tag m atic  re la tions
The main error in Trier's (1973) work on semantic fields is that he 
envisaged the vocabulary of a language as forming a complete 
semantic structure which covers an underlying conceptual area in 
which the meaning of one word delimits that of its neighbour without 
gaps and without overlapping; a view often referred to as the two- 
dimensional ‘mosaic’ metaphor. Overlaps of meaning are, by 
contrast, a constantly observable fact of language which make 
synonymy, partial synonymy and definition possible and provide 
redundancy in the vocabulary. If all the possible meanings of words 
and the boundaries between these meanings were established and 
unchanging in a vocabulary there would be no possibility, for 
example, of expressing a new idea. In a living language, however, 
the possibility of conveying new meanings is continually present, as 
new elements and new combinations are introduced and as new 
semantic uses are found for existing words. Modern field-theory 
recognises the role of semantic overlapping. In Roget's Thesaurus 
(1987), for example, a ‘head-word’ is followed by a range of words 
which are thought to share with it some element of meaning, and any 
single lexeme might appear in a number of different categories. For 
example, ‘hope’ as a head-word in the section entitled ‘Emotion, 
religion and morality’ is followed by expectation, assumption, 
presumption, and so on, but hope can also be found in the section 
‘Time’ under the head-word ‘futurity’ and alongside horoscope, 
crystal gazing, forecast, etc.
Trier's (1973) ‘two-dimensional’ approach might also be described as 
paradigm atic. Saussure had recognised and contrasted paradigmatic 
and syntagm atic relations between units in a language-system. A 
paradigmatic relationship holds between a particular unit and those 
with which it can be substituted. Lyons (1977:241) writes:
10
... "old" is paradigmatically related with "young", "tall", etc., 
in expressions like "the old man", "the young man", "the tall 
man", etc., as "man" is paradigmatically related with "woman", 
"dog", etc., in expressions like "the old man", "the old woman", 
"the old dog", etc.
A paradigmatic approach, whereby the relationship between meanings 
of words in a language is envisaged as consisting only of 
corresponding widenings and narrowings, cannot do justice to the 
complexity of the relations that we can, in fact, observe between 
lexemes. There are many ways and degrees to which words may be 
similar or different in meaning. The multitude of relations which 
hold between elements of a vocabulary can most faithfully be 
represented by a thesaurus, which records, through a system of cross- 
referencing, the various ranges of lexemes with which each given 
lexeme has some element of meaning in common.
In contrast to Trier’s (1973) theory, his contemporary W. Porzig 
(1950) developed a notion of semantic fields which was founded on 
the relationship of meaning that holds between pairs of 
syntagmatically connected lexemes. A syntagmatic relation holds 
between units combined with other units of the same level in the 
language structure. In the case of lexical meaning, this is the 
relationship between a given lexeme and those used alongside it, the 
study of which is sometimes known as the ‘semantics of the phrase’. 
Lyons (1977:240):
... the lexeme "old" is syntagmatically related with the definite 
article "the" and the noun "man" in the expression "the old 
man";..
Modern field-theory, and its product the thesaurus, recognises that the 
structure of a vocabulary can be understood only when the 
syntagmatic, as well as the paradigmatic, relations between the 
elements are identified. A thesaurus incorporates syntagmatic and 
paradigmatic relations between words by including, not only those
words which might be substituted for a given lexeme, but also those 
with which it shares some element of meaning. For example, the 
section ‘Death’ in the Historical Thesaurus includes not only the 
syonyms for death - decease, passing, demise, and so on, but also 
nouns which, although not simply substitutable for death, such as 
death-rattle, share the concept of ‘death’ in their meaning. In the 
same section we can also find lexemes of all the other parts of speech 
which involve the concepts ‘death’, ‘dying’ and ‘dead’. Trier, as we 
have seen, comprehended the need for a synchronic, as well as a 
diachronic viewpoint, but not for a syntagmatic, as well as a 
paradigmatic approach.
Across languages and tim e
A further error on Trier's part was that he assumed that the 
vocabularies of all languages cover the same conceptual fields. This 
assumption raises questions about the relationship between language 
and reality; between the concepts to which the speakers of a particular 
language give expression, as opposed to those of which the speakers 
do, or might potentially conceive.
It is generally accepted by modern linguists that the vocabulary of a 
language is structured in ways that reflect the collective experience 
and perception of its speakers - a view which is supported by the 
widely observed discrepancies between the conceptual systems 
reflected in different languages. The fact that Eskimos have words 
for types of snow which differ in ways too subtle for inhabitants of 
warmer parts of the world to comprehend, is a commonly used 
example. We do not have in English an equivalent lexeme for each of 
these Eskimo words because we are unable, and have no need to, 
conceive of so many types of snow, so that, in this aspect at least, our 
conceptual system differs from that of Eskimos. In this example, the 
linguistic contrast arises due to an easily observable difference 
between the area inhabited by Eskimos and those normally inhabited 
by speakers of English, but there are many other differences between 
languages that arise from different perceptions of what appears to be
12
the same entity by speakers of these languages. Moreover, the so- 
called S apir-W horf hypothesis (see also pp. 104-105) holds that, 
not only is a language structured by the conceptual system of its 
speakers as we have seen from the example of Eskimo words for 
types of snow, but that the conceptual system is, at the same time, 
structured by language. This process, therefore, further 
differentiates the conceptual systems of speakers of different 
languages.
Trier (1973), then, was mistaken in his assumption that neat 
correlation in structure exists between vocabularies of different 
languages. His mistake teaches us that the vocabulary of a language 
should be viewed as independent of, but shaped by, the concepts 
which it structures, which are, in turn, independent, but 
representative, of the underlying ‘reality’.
Similarly, the conceptual system of speakers of a single language 
might differ through time, so that a particular semantic field at t1 
differs from the field at t2 in ways which suggest change in the 
perception of the underlying conceptual area. Lyons (1977:252, 4) 
observes that comparison of a field at times t1 and t2 is likely to 
reveal change in the ‘internal structure’ of that field - the way in 
which it is divided up by language. Chapter 4 discusses the 
development of perceptions of death in the west throughout the period 
of history covered by the English language, and we will find that 
death, although an ever-present feature of human history, has been 
percieved in ways which differ through time. It will be suggested in 
that chapter that some of the developments in the language used to 
discuss death have been motivated by developments in the perception 
of death itself.
In this thesis, which considers the language covering the conceptual 
field ‘death’ throughout its history, the diachronic approach will 
occasionally be supplemented by observations from a synchronic 
viewpoint, making possible analysis of the state of this section of the
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vocabulary at different points in time. Lyons (1977:255) lists the 
linguistic developments which we might expect to find in such an 
investigation:
...we might find: (i) that there has been no change either in the 
set of lexemes belonging to the two fields or in their sense- 
relations; (ii) that one of the lexemes has been replaced with a 
new lexeme (or each of a subset of the lexemes has been 
replaced) without, however, any change in the internal 
structure of the conceptual field; (iii) that there has been no 
change in the set of lexemes, but there has been a change of 
some kind in the internal structure of the conceptual field; (iv) 
that one (or more) of the lexemes has been replaced and the 
internal structure of the conceptual field has also changed; (v) 
that one (or more) of the lexemes has been added or lost with 
(of necessity, if we discount for the moment the possibility of 
synonymy in the earlier or later system) some consequential 
change in the internal structure of the conceptual field.
This investigation, covering several centuries, allows us to observe 
changes such as these described in (iv) and (v): substitution of the 
items comprising the field and consequent change in the structure of 
the field. As for the developments described in (ii) and (iii) we can 
assume that these have occurred between relatively short intervals in 
time as part as part of the gradual but constant process of semantic 
change. The absence of change described in (i) is possible only in 
languages which have ceased to be spoken (see pp.23-24), since the 
recognition of two distinct language states necessarily involves 
intervening time between them in which semantic change will occur.
Summary
1) Lexical meaning is to be understood in terms of the relation of a 
particular lexeme to other elements of the vocabulary system.
2) We have seen that from post-Saussurean structuralist thought has
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developed an understanding of the principles involved in the 
investigation of a vocabulary as a system of related elements.
3) A synchronic view of successive language states supplements a 
diachronic viewpoint in order to describe the language at particular 
points in time as well as the changes which have taken place between 
two points in time.
4) Syntagmatic relations between elements of the vocabulary structure 
combine with a paradigmatic approach, making possible an 
understanding of all the kinds of sense relations that can hold between 
lexemes.
5) Every language covers a unique conceptual system.
Chapter 2
SEMANTIC CHANGE
Chapter 1 considered the word and its meaning as part of the system 
of language. This chapter will consider what happens when a word 
changes its meaning and how this change effects other elements of the 
system. On the subject of studying change in language, Saussure 
wrote (1960:140):
What diachronic linguistics studies is not relations between co­
existing terms of a language-state but relations between 
successive terms that are substituted for each other in time.
It is hoped that, in this thesis, we can combine the diachronic study of 
substitution with an approach which recognizes the structured, 
systematic nature of language.
Principles of change
A number of contemporary writers including Michael Samuels (1972) 
and Jeremy Smith (1996) have noted the correlations between the 
principles of linguistic change and those of biological evolution, and 
the advantages of using an evolutionary model to study linguistic 
change. Smith (1996:41) writes:
To describe linguistic change as evolutionary is, of course, in 
one way a metaphor, since the notion of evolution was first 
established in biology and has simply been transferred to 
linguistic study by analogy. However, it may be permissible to 
argue that historical linguistics is literally an evolutionary 
discipline, since the mechanisms of change with which the 
subject engages seem to work in evolutionary ways.
The ‘mechanisms of change’ will be described briefly in the following 
paragraph. A detailed account of their similarities with the
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mechanisms of biological evolution is felt to be unnecessary here. 
Readers should bear in mind Darwin’s ‘survival of the fittest’ 
principle, by which, through a series of biological mutations 
producing tiny changes between generations of a species, ‘useful’ 
characteristics - those which best equip the organism for the 
environment in which it lives - are preferred, while less useful ones 
are discarded.
Firstly, variation, the slight differences which exist between 
individuals in pronunciation and choice of form with which to express 
a meaning, is a vital feature within all living languages. Variation, in 
the pronunciation of a word for example, makes available alternatives 
- what Samuels calls (1972:9) the ‘raw material of linguistic change’ - 
which may or may not be selected by other speakers. If a particular 
innovation is selected by another speaker, linguistic change has taken 
place. Samuels (1972:10) writes:
As regards the step from variant to change, we may adopt, for 
the present, a simple formula: the variant is misunderstood as 
an acceptable form (or reinterpreted) by the hearer, and, when 
this has happened often enough and been subsequently imitated, 
it ceases to be merely part of parole (sporadic usage in the 
speech of individuals) and is accepted into langue (the language, 
either in abstract or as codified).
The distinction between langue and parole, roughly ‘language’ and 
‘speech’, is that originally made by Saussure (1960:9):
... language [...] is not to be confused with human speech, of 
which it is only a definite part, though certainly an essential 
one. It is both a social product of the faculty of speech and a 
collection of necessary conventions that have been adopted by a 
social body to permit individuals to exercise that faculty.
Taken as a whole, speech is many-sided and heterogeneous; 
straddling several areas simultaneously - physical, 
physiological, and psychological - it belongs both to the 
individual and to society. [...] Language, on the contrary, is a
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self-contained whole and a principle of classification.
Samuels observes that the selection or actuation of a form that 
results in linguistic change normally occurs due to the variant being 
‘misunderstood’ by the hearer ‘as an acceptable form’, but, I would 
argue, it is not necessarily the case that the ‘imitating’ speaker is 
mistakenly or accidentally using the form in its new meaning. This is 
especially notable in the case of speakers who form a sub-culture of 
some sort, for example the group formed by teenage speakers, who 
regularly select forms for use in functions which deviate from their 
‘normal’ functions in order to signal their social differentness.
The variant form, once selected for use by another speaker, will 
become structurally significant, that is, part of the language system, if 
it is im plem ented by the speech-community. Finally, diffusion of 
the form outside the speech-community may or may not take place. 
This is the account of linguistic change which will be adhered to 
throughout this thesis. Smith (1996:44) writes:
Since Weinreich et al. (1968), three stages in the operation of 
linguistic change have been generally distinguished by linguists: 
actuation, implementation and diffusion. [...] a slightly 
modified version of this categorisation is adopted here: the 
potential fo r  change, the triggering and implementation o f  
change, the diffusion o f change. The potential for change exists 
in the particular linguistic choices made by particular language- 
users at a particular time; such choices may be compared with 
the constant process of biological mutation; it is constantly 
taking place, for it exists in the perpetual ebb and flow of 
linguistic variation. When linguists refer to linguistic change, 
they tend to refer to implementation and diffusion, that is, the 
systemic development.
Diachronic investigation is, of course, concerned with change. 
Ullmann (1957:171) writes:
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Synchronistic [synchronic] semantics is the science of meaning, 
diachronistic [diachronic] semantics the science of changes of 
meaning. The former revolves round the semantic 
relationship, simple or multiple; the latter is concerned with * 
semantic change.
The recognition of the vocabulary as an interrelated system of 
elements has enabled linguists to understand semantic change as a 
process involving not only the individual lexeme but also those most 
closely related to it formally, semantically and sometimes 
phonologicallyl. But the initial step towards an understanding of 
semantic change is to explain the process by which a single form 
comes to be used to mean something different than formerly.
Leonard Bloomfield (1933:430) attempted to explain the process in 
terms of shift, defined by him as follows:
When we find a form used at one time in a meaning A and at a 
later time in a meaning B, what we see is evidently the result of 
at least two shifts, namely, an expansion of the form from use 
in situations of type A to use in situations of a wider type A-B, 
and then a partial obsolescence by which the form ceases to be 
used in situations which approximate the old type A, so that 
finally the form is used only in situations of type B.
Bloomfield’s account, although limited by the writer’s empirical 
approach (see also pp. 1-2), improved upon earlier theories like that 
of Herman Paul (1888) by adding to the notion of expansion of 
meaning, the notion of the encroachment of rival forms and
1 Phonological change is outside the scope o f this thesis. The following 
examples, however, provided by Allan (1991:23) illustrate the impact o f  
the taboo meaning o f c o c k  on meanings which sound similar:
There has also been an effect on words containing c o c k : for example, 
former Mayor Ed Koch  of New York City gives his surname a spelling 
p r o n u n cia tio n  /k o £ / which rhymes with S c o t c h ; the family o f Louisa 
May A l c o t t  (author o f Little Women) changed their name from A lc o x \  
c o c k r o a c h  is often foreclipped to roach  in American...
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simultaneous yielding of ultimately unsuccessful forms in the process 
of semantic change; an early recognition of the fact that change 
cannot occur without consequent disturbance in the system.
Stephen Ullmann (1957:199-249) moves closer to structuralist 
principles, insisting on the importance of ‘association’ - the 
connections which hold between groups of words either through form 
or through meaning - to semantic change, although he claims that the 
structural approach is appropriate only for his class of ‘semantic 
changes due to linguistic innovation’ and not for those due to 
‘linguistic conservatism’. The former category includes ‘transfer of 
names’ whereby a form is used to refer to something other than that 
which it formerly referred to based on a perceived similarity between 
the objects, and ‘transfer of senses’ whereby a form is used to refer to 
an object due to its similarity with the usual name of that object. His 
category of ‘linguistic conservatism’ (1957:209) consists of changes in 
the relationship between a word and its referent due to changes in the 
world, known as ‘shift’ by later writers including Waldron. He 
provides the following examples of words which have undergone 
change of this sort (1957:209):
...’book’ before and after printing; ‘artillery’ and its
terminology before and after the invention of gunpowder;
‘plume’ of goose-quill and ‘plume’ of steel, and so on.
Such changes should be, and are by contemporary linguists, perceived 
as structural since they affect related elements within the vocabulary 
system. By continuing to use the form book for the printed volumes 
of the modern age, the alternatives which might be used, for example, 
publication, volume, etc. are selected for use less often, and forms 
which might potentially be used to mean ‘book’, if the form book was 
unable to fulfil this function, occupy some other slot in the semantic 
structure.
R.A. Waldron (1967) discusses Ullmann's (1957, 1962) theory of
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semantic change, and his own is to some extent a reaction against the 
neat categorization attempted by Ullmann. He writes, for example 
(1967:115):
...symmetry and elegance appear to have been constant 
preoccupations of those who have proposed schemes of 
semantic change!
Waldron perceives lexical meaning, and change of meaning, in terms 
of linguistic categories whereby the individual word functions as an 
element in the classificatory system which we construct through 
language. We construct this system by assigning aspects of our 
experience to categories shared by concepts which we perceive to be 
similar, and we use this classificatory system to structure our 
language. The category of ‘colour words’, (p.4), which is common to 
all languages, illustrates the fact that we perceive colours as having an 
element in common (that is, ‘colour’) and the language that we use to 
talk about colours as forming a sub-set within the vocabulary.
Semantic change, defined by Waldron (1967:114) as ‘change in a 
word’s criteria of reference’ occurs when there is alteration of some 
kind in the system of categories. T ransfer for Waldron corresponds 
to Ullmann’s (1957) ‘transfer of names’ in ‘changes due to linguistic 
innovation’. In a passage in which he criticises Ullmann’s ‘linguistic 
conservatism/innovation’ division, he writes (1967:140):
If we thus rigorously define a change of meaning as a change in 
the word’s criteria of reference we shall find ourselves 
contemplating two major types: modification of an existing 
linguistic category (which I call Shift) and change to a different 
category (or Transfer).
Waldron correctly regards Ullmann’s (1957, 1962) ‘transfer of 
senses’ category, which includes ellipsis and folk-etymology, as 
changes of form rather than of meaning. He follows Ullmann, 
however, in retaining metaphoric and metonymic transfer as the other
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types of semantic change along with shift. Transfer will be discussed 
together with metaphor below (pp.29-35)2.
‘Shift’, which corresponds to a change due to ‘linguistic conservatism’ 
in Ullmann’s (1957) system, is defined by Waldron thus (1957:142):
...the type of sense development in which a marginal change
occurs among the criteria of a lexical category.
He provides, by way of example, the development of the word 
sophisticated. The meaning or ‘reference-category’ of this word had 
altered since the beginning of the century by the 1960’s, shedding its 
former negative associations and incorporating the positive ones 
which it has today. A contemporary example can be seen in the 
development of sad. The central meaning of ‘sorrowful, mournful’ 
appears to have been supplanted in the speech of many young people 
by ‘dull, boring’. A person described as sad in this latter meaning 
may be perfectly happy, so that statements like “She’s really sad, but 
she seems quite happy”, have become logical. It remains to be seen 
whether this shift will become structurally significant since sad 
continues to be used by the majority of speakers in its ‘sorrowful’ 
meaning. Waldron cohiments that many shifts are motivated by 
limited understanding of a word's meaning on the part of young 
people, leading to slightly inaccurate application of that word. Whilst 
this is undoubtedly true, failure to discern the common meaning of a 
word and consequent inaccurate application of that word is something 
of which even highly experienced speakers are sometimes guilty.
According to Samuels (1972:52), the principal process of linguistic 
change, present at every level of language, is extension, defined by 
him as follows:
...any process by which the use of a form is extended to a
2 Since metonymy is felt to have little relevance to this study it will not 
be discussed here.
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larger number of meanings or grammatical functions than it 
has hitherto possessed, its information-value being thereby 
reduced.
This account contributes two important dimensions to our description 
of semantic change. Firstly, it is not simply that a particular form is 
used to mean ‘B ’ where it was once used to mean ‘A’, (as both the 
names ‘shift’ and ‘transfer’ suggest), but that it can be used to mean 
‘B ’ as well as ‘A ’ for a period of time and either or both meanings 
might survive. Secondly, both meanings ‘A’ and ‘B’ will be affected 
by the fact that one form can now be used to mean either one of them, 
thereby lowering the information-content of the form: a situation 
which often results in ambiguity.
Conditions for change
The question of why words change their meaning has been widely 
discussed by writers including, notably, Waldron (1967) and Samuels 
(1972). Waldron cites ‘semantic vagueness’ as the underlying 
condition for many shifts (1957:145):
Until quite recently, vagueness in language was regarded as a 
purely negative characteristic, however, it being taken for 
granted universally that precision was the goal and aim of all 
discourse; it is perhaps only since the dissemination of the 
philosophy of Wittgenstein that vagueness has been accepted as 
an inevitable, and indeed useful, feature of language, enabling 
us not only to speak when we cannot, or do not wish to, commit 
ourselves to precise lines of definition, but also to adapt 
traditional categories to changes in circumstances or changes in 
thought.
‘Semantic vagueness’ or the variational space surrounding the 
meanings of words, has, therefore come to be recognized as a vital 
feature of any living language. All living languages are constantly in 
a state of change; a language which has ceased to be used - a dead
language - naturally ceases to change. The meanings of its words and 
the boundaries between meanings have become fixed so that it no 
longer makes sense to speak of variational space surrounding them. 
Smith (1996:44) writes:
Variation is possible because individual linguistic items occupy 
fairly broad slots in the langue within which they are situated, 
and their realisations in parole can therefore vary quite widely. 
[...(1996:46)...] it is a proven fact that words mean different 
things in different contexts, and therefore have a fairly broad 
variational space.
It is, therefore, the variational space surrounding a meaning of a 
word which enables development of that meaning; within it lie all the 
potential applications or realisations of the form it surrounds.
Change tends to occur in the direction of functional improvement; a 
form, or elements of a form, which is more suitable for the function 
for which it is used will tend to succeed. This means that, on the one 
hand, languages tend towards a state of equilibrium in which all the 
elements are in stable relation to one another - a situation only 
actually achieved in the case of dead languages. The factor which 
prevents this happening in living languages is change produced by 
contact with other varieties of language. Smith (1996: 48) writes:
Contact is a crucial factor in linguistic change because no 
language or variety of language exists in a vacuum. Speech- 
communities come into contact with other speech-communities 
in all sorts of situations, and the subsequent interaction between 
these communities causes linguistic change.
Contact will be discussed in more detail below (pp.42-43, 86-93).
Waldron (1967:124) distinguishes four types of semantic vagueness, 
summarised as follows. There are cases of deliberate generality 
concerning a word's meaning - a useful feature of language since it is 
often neither desirable nor possible to be precise. Generality can be a 
factor leading to shift, widening the linguistic category to include
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what were formerly associative criteria, or narrow ing  it to disclude 
what were formerly particularizing criteria. An example of 
generality leading to shift provided by Waldron, is that of the word 
bad (1957:148) which is related to OE bceddel ( ‘hermaphrodite’) and 
bcedling ( ‘effeminate person’) and is thought to have meant 
‘imperfect, undeveloped in growth’, clearly a narrower meaning than 
that commonly used today.
Almost all shifts involve generalization or narrowing, also known as 
‘specialization’. Typically, words develop narrower meanings 
through being used in restricted contexts, and words originally 
restricted in application broaden their meanings when they pass into 
less specialized registers. Waldron stresses the importance of context 
to semantic development (1957:149):
...as far as specialization is concerned, we have a tendency to 
bring contextual clues to bear on the interpretation of words in 
discourse; we thus, as interpreters, determine to varying extents 
the precise application of a word from the circumstances of its 
use. Now, if in our experience as individual speakers, a word 
like this is always associated with the same context or the same 
situation, with perhaps only slight variations, and provided we 
hardly ever hear the word used in radically different 
circumstances, we shall come to accept the familiar determining 
factors (which we began by deducing from the context) as 
constituents of the word’s meaning.
A particular area of specialization, very significant in the semantic 
field ‘Death’, is the process by which words which were originally 
euphemistic become increasingly specific and, since they are 
concerned with taboo concepts, come to be perceived as indelicate 
(see also p.84). Samuels writes (1972:150):
A general word is chosen deliberately in preference to a more 
particular one; in time the context of use forces a narrower 
meaning upon it and as this occurs people avoid using it in its
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more general sense, for reasons of delicacy.
This is the chief reason for the commonly noted phenomenon 
whereby a euphemism becomes inadequate for the function it is 
required to perform and is consequently replaced by a new 
euphemism. Samuels (1972:54) writes:
...as soon as the euphemism is no longer recognised as such by 
other speakers, it has undergone extension to include that 
referent in its meaning; a new euphemism is then required (e.g. 
toilet, bathroom), and so the cycle is endlessly repeated.
V ariation amongst individual speakers as to the precise meaning of a 
word results in widening of its linguistic category to incorporate 
differences in usage and consequently to polysemy and shift. This is a 
very common feature in evaluative language, which depends for its 
meaning on cultural as well as individual value systems which can 
often conflict. For example, it is interesting to note a more recent 
development in the meaning of bad than that mentioned by Waldron 
above (p.25). It appears that, amongst certain young, chiefly U.S. 
speakers, bad has recently undergone amelioration, reflecting the 
values - physical toughness, lack of humility and respect for 
established authority - which have come to be prized in that sub­
culture. This development reveals a value system different from that 
of the dominant culture in which bad is exclusively negative in 
meaning.
Waldron claims that there will almost always be a degree of 
indeterm inacy about the meanings of words, since no decision was 
ever taken on the precise limits of many words and there is often no 
dividing line in nature between the things to which we refer. He 
might have said that there is always a degree of indeterminacy, since, 
even after the definition of a word has been ‘fixed’ by a 
lexicographer, there will still be a degree of indeterminacy regarding 
the application of the word amongst different speakers and in 
different situations.
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Waldron writes (1957:146) that am biguity, although a type of 
semantic vagueness, is a cause of transfer rather than shift. When a 
form is used in two ambiguous meanings, one of those meanings will 
tend to become obsolete, thereby creating an ‘empty slot’ - a meaning 
in need of a name. Em pty slots are possible only in theory as 
Samuels (1972:65) reminds us:
‘Empty slots’ never exist literally, since circumlocution in lexis 
and marked forms in grammar are always available. But the 
degree to which circumlocutions are tolerated is limited, so that 
the ultimate effect is the same as if empty slots actually existed.
The process by which an empty slot ‘attracts’ a form is called by 
Samuels (1972:65) functional pull. The need to avoid empty slots 
in the vocabulary will often encourage the process of extension in an 
existing word. Otherwise they are filled through the process of 
lexical intake or innovation (1972:61), either extrasystem ic or 
intrasystem ic. Extrasystemic changes are those which originate 
outside the particular system of language in which they occur. At the 
level of the vocabulary the principal example of this is the borrowing 
of loanwords. Intrasystemic changes, those which arise within the 
system, include derivation and compounding. Samuels (1972:7) 
writes:
...intrasystemic factors [are] those that operate within a single 
linguistic system, [...]; and extrasystemic factors are those that 
influence a system from outside it as a result of contact with 
another system...
Intake and innovation are also considered to be the ‘raw-material’ of 
change because, although there tends to be a greater degree of 
motivation in the origin of these forms than in the case of extensions, 
they exist as variants since many of them never become part of the 
vocabulary system.
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We have noted the distinction between extrasystemic and 
intrasystemic factors that give rise to change. Another useful 
distinction in diachronic linguistics is the wider one which can be 
made between extralinguistic factors - those which are external to 
language - and in tralinguistic (Samuels, 1972:2):
...they [intralinguistic changes] arise internally for no other 
reason than that language, as a tool in constant use is a) liable to 
constant fluctuation, and/or b) in need of constant ‘repair’ or 
‘renewal’.
The ‘repair’ or ‘renewal’ mentioned by Samuels is otherwise known 
as systemic regulation - a name which covers the mechanisms with 
which we strive to increase the efficiency and decrease the ambiguity 
of language. For example, in order to express a meaning for which 
more than one form is available, the speaker will often select the least 
ambiguous form - that which has the least number of available 
meanings. The avoidance of forms thought to be ambiguous is 
diffused, just as semantic extensions are diffused, by imitation, 
thereby reducing the use of ambiguous forms and increasing the use 
of less ambiguous forms in their place. There is, therefore, within 
the system of language, a continual process of extension and limitation 
of those extensions which are believed to impede the efficiency of 
language.
Similarly, there is no need in language for two or more words with 
exactly the same meaning. We will see in Chapter 3 that even 
amongst the supposed synonyms of the semantic field ‘Death’, we can 
either identify some difference between them in meaning or, in the 
case of obsolete words, confidently assume that a differentiating 
element which is no longer observable previously existed. This is a 
result of the process called by Samuels (1972:64) d ifferentiation , 
which occurs when the meanings of two lexemes become sufficiently 
close, and by which some distinction arises between them.
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There is, however, a need in the vocabulary for forms which can 
perform a similar, if not an identical, function. This is because the 
development of language is motivated not only by a desire for greater 
efficiency of expression, but also for variety and subtlety of 
expression; we like to have available alternative ways of expressing a 
single idea. We can, for example, distinguish within the synonyms 
for ‘death’ in use at one time, differences of register rendering them 
more or less appropriate for particular contexts. Samuels writes 
(1972:28):
The essential complement of the substance of communication 
[parole] is the system [langue]: this requires stability of 
functional units which are discrete in form yet overlap 
sufficiently in function to provide a margin of redundancy.
The redundancy mentioned by Samuels is a feature which 
contributes to the efficiency of language by allowing a degree of 
overlap between meanings, and also between sounds and grammatical 
functions. At its most effectual level, redundancy helps the hearer 
understand the speaker’s intended message, whilst maintaining 
economy of effort on the part of the speaker.
Transfer and metaphor
Semantic change involves not only shift, whereby the meaning of a 
form is altered in some way, but also tran sfe r whereby a form is 
used to mean something different than formerly. Transfer is 
recognized by linguists as closely related to m etaphor since both 
involve the extension of a form to a new meaning. This type of 
development is a central characteristic of the semantic field ‘Death’, 
since, as I will argue below, death is a difficult concept to 
comprehend and is often felt to be unpleasant to discuss. These 
difficulties encourage the process by which we discuss death using 
language which has been transferred from other areas of the 
vocabulary.
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Waldron distinguished metaphoric from metonymic transfer. He 
follows Richards (1936) and Black (1962) in his conception of 
metaphor as based on a resemblance between what is normally 
designated by the word (vehicle) and what is designated by its 
metaphoric use (tenor). The resemblance here is that which holds 
between two linguistic categories rather than between things in 
reality.
Waldron perceives metaphorical categorization as an extension of 
normal linguistic activity in which exceptionally wide categories are 
used. This is particularly apparent in idiomatic metaphors like pass 
away meaning ‘die’, where the meaning of the form widened to 
incorporate the association of ‘dying', now central to the meaning.
He points to the vagueness of linguistic categories as a reason for the 
difficulty of distinguishing through time between metaphors and 
literal expressions. He also introduces the notion of ‘sleeping’ 
metaphors (as opposed to ‘dead’ or idiomatic metaphors) as a 
description of those which are on their way to becoming idiomatic, 
but for which speakers retain a slight sense of their metaphorical 
origin.
Samuels (1972:53) discusses the way in which extensions, including 
metaphor, become ‘devalued’ with use. By this process, the 
relationship between the form and its meaning becomes increasingly 
literal and decreasingly metaphorical with every instance of use.
Parallel to the devaluation of overstatements is that of 
metaphors. These, when first used, are expressive innovations, 
but later, when outworn, they supply little more than near­
synonyms in a meaning already well supplied with forms, e.g. 
ass in the sense of ‘fool’.
This process is accelerated in the area of euphemistic metaphors, 
discussed below, where the ‘taboo’ nature of the meaning ensures that 
any form used to designate that meaning becomes quickly associated
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with it and consequently inappropriate for meanings which are not 
taboo.
Lakoff and Johnson (1981) continue the process by which linguists 
such as Black (1962) and Waldron (1967) have sought to clearly 
distinguish the common linguistic phenomenon of metaphor from its 
literary counterpart. They argue that we are unlikely to be aware of 
the great extent to which language is metaphorical because a great 
deal of the metaphor is so deeply embedded within it. They write 
(1981:3):
...metaphor is pervasive in everyday life, not just in language 
but in thought and action. Our ordinary conceptual system, in 
terms of which we both think and act, is fundamentally 
metaphorical in nature.
They show that, since our conceptual system is primarily 
metaphorical (we perceive one thing in terms of another), the 
language we use is structured by metaphor (we talk about one thing in 
terms of another). Metaphor, according to this account, arises when 
the concepts (or ‘linguistic categories’) involved are different, and 
when one of the concepts is partially structured in terms of the other. 
They write (1981:4):
To give some idea of what it could mean for a concept to be 
metaphorical and for such a concept to structure an everyday 
activity, let us start with the concept ARGUMENT IS WAR. 
This metaphor is reflected in our everyday language by a wide 
variety of expressions:
ARGUMENT IS WAR 
Your claims are indefensible.
He attacked every weak point in my argument.
His criticisms were right on target.
In these everyday statements we can see that the language associated 
with the concept ‘war’ is used to talk about aspects of the experience 
of ‘argument’. We structure language in this way because we
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perceive the experience of arguing in terms of our understanding of 
‘war’, involving, for example, an opponent against whom we must try 
to defend ourselves whilst trying to attack him/her, in order to win 
rather than lose.
Lakoff and Johnson identify three types of metaphor - structural 
(highly evident in the semantic field ‘Death’), orientational and 
ontological. Structural metaphors are of the kind illustrated by 
ARGUMENT IS WAR, where one concept is partially structured in 
terms of another. A pervasive structural metaphor from ‘Death’ is 
DEATH IS A JOURNEY, seen in items like departed and gone. 
Orientational metaphors occur when we use our experience of our 
own bodies and their interaction with the world around us to 
structure a concept. Lakoff and Johnson (1981:15) provide the 
example HAPPY IS UP; SAD IS DOWN, based on our experience 
that happiness tends to correspond with a relatively upright position 
of the body, raised corners of the mouth, etc., seen in expressions 
such as:
...That boosted my spirits. My spirits rose. You’re in high 
spirits. I ’m feeling down. I ’m depressed. He’s really low 
these days....
An orientational metaphor relevant to the semantic field ‘Death’ 
might be called LIFE IS HERE; DEATH IS AWAY, seen in 
expressions such as:
He passed away. She is no longer with us. I ’m afraid he’s 
gone.
In forming ontological metaphors we use our experience of physical 
objects and substances (these things which are more clearly delineated 
in our minds) to talk about things which are less clearly delineated. A 
common type is the container metaphor where we view entities as 
containers that can contain other entities. Examples of this are 
(1981:32):
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He’s in love. He’s coming out c /th e  coma. ... He entered a 
state of euphoria.
The language surrounding ‘death’ suggests that, unlike most other 
states of the mind and body, it is not perceived by us as a container 
into which the individual can enter; not a single item in the semantic 
field involves this type of metaphor. We can only speculate on the 
reason for our refusal to conceive of death in this way, but it may 
stem from a basic denial that death possesses such ‘container-like’ 
properties, with ourselves the intended contents. To incorporate such 
a notion into our conceptual system would involve acceptance of the 
fact that death is continually possible for each of us; a notion which 
we must, for the most part, disregard in order to live happy lives. 
Another factor which renders the container metaphor inappropriate 
for conceiving of or talking about death, is that death, unlike sleep or 
a coma, is a state from which the individual can never emerge.
The similar but less anxiety-provoking metaphor of the body as 
container of life is occasionally used, seen in expressions such as:
She gave up the ghost3.
The rarity of such metaphors suggests that we prefer to avoid 
reference to a division between spirit and body - an idea which we 
naturally find frightening (see chapter 4). The vast majority of the 
items comprising the semantic field ‘Death’ preserve in metaphor the 
unity of spirit and body after death:
He passed on. She's gone to the other side. He's left us.
It has been noted above that the prevalence of metaphor in this field is
3 The final OED  quote for give up the ghost meaning ‘die’ comes from 
1879. The meaning appears to have changed to, simply, ‘give up’.
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due to the difficulty of discussing death, firstly, because it can never 
be understood as a subjective experience in life, and secondly, because 
it is often felt to be too sombre or distressing to discuss directly. We 
employ, therefore, a range of euphemistic metaphors to structure our 
discourse about death. We have seen that the language surrounding 
the concept ‘death’ employs different types of metaphor as well as 
language transferred from different areas of the vocabulary. These 
areas of the vocabulary used to talk about death form the 
‘metaphorical clusters’ which comprise the semantic field ‘Death’. A 
comprehensive breakdown of the field in terms of its metaphorical 
clusters appears in chapter 3 (pp.66-73).
Metaphor, then, is utilised widely in the semantic field ‘Death’, 
enabling discussion of a subject which arouses anxiety within us. The 
type of metaphor which is motivated by a desire to avoid direct 
reference to an unpleasant topic, is known as euphem ism . The 
euphemistic extension enters another conceptual area covered by the 
language as in metaphor, but the area is selected, not only for its 
similarity with, but for the fact that it is perceived as ‘better’ than 
what it is used to denote. For example with the common DEATH IS 
A JOURNEY metaphor (see p.32), the concept ‘journey’ is selected 
not simply for the perceived similarities between ‘dying’ and ‘going 
on a journey’, but because going on a journey is deemed a nicer 
experience than dying.
It is hoped that we can produce in the following pages a description of 
the operation of euphemism - a process whose treatment in the 
literature has tended to be relatively unscientific. Writers (including 
Adams (1985), Allan and Burridge (1991), Andersson and Trudgill 
(1990), Ayto (1993), Burchfield (1985), Cobb (1985), Griffin 
(1985), Gross (1985), Hughes (1991), Noble (1982) and Partridge 
(1970, 1984)) have concentrated on the question of why euphemism 
arises, to the detriment of the equally important question of how 
euphemism develops and functions within the vocabulary. Both issues 
are addressed in the following pages of this thesis, beginning with the 
question of why we need euphemisms in the first place. The
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discussion of euphemism will be followed by an enquiry into 
dysphem ism , generally regarded as the opposite of euphemism, but 
which, I hope to demonstrate, is better understood as a closely related 
phenomenon. I will distinguish euphemism and dysphemism from 
both neu tra l language - that which lacks metaphorical conntotations - 
and taboo language or ‘swearing’.
form literal meaning
dead ‘cessation of life’
no longer with us ‘absence/departure’
six fee t under ‘investiture of body underground’
Figure 2.1
Figure 2.1 provides examples of the three types of lexeme - neutral, 
euphemistic and dysphemistic - which we find in the semantic field 
‘Death’.
Taboo and Euphemism
Euphemism proliferates in the taboo areas of the language and is 
often defined in terms of its relation to taboo; for example, Ayto 
(1993:1) defines euphemism as:
A euphemism is an avoidance term...[and]...the set of 
communicative strategies we have evolved to refer to a topic 
under a taboo, without actually contravening its terms.
The earlier, anthropological application of the term ‘taboo’ in English 
is provided by Spears (1981 :ix) as follows:
“Taboo” is a Polynesian word for any of a number of religious 
prohibitions which forbid specified behavior usually under the 
threat of some kind of punishment. Many of the taboos of this 
type are absolute, that is, they are always in effect regardless of
neutral
euphemistic
. . x. metaphoricaldysphemistic
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the situation. Many of them involve offenses toward the spirit 
world and religious custom.
This understanding of the term has prompted writers including Gross 
(1985:203) to argue that there is no real taboo operating in western 
culture, by comparison with cultures in which, for example, it is 
forbidden to speak the name of a dead person and believed that one’s 
own death will result from doing so. The travel writer Bruce 
Chatwin (1987:104) records an incident in central Australia in which 
a white man, having murdered four Aboriginal youths, is acquitted 
because none of the dozens of Aboriginal witnesses would testify 
against him :
‘Aboriginal witnesses’, he said, ‘are not always easy to handle.
They refuse, for example, to hear the dead man called by name.’ 
‘You mean they wouldn’t testify?’
‘It makes the case for the prosecution difficult.’
There is, of course, no such strong taboo in our culture, but it is 
useful to apply the term to those areas of life which, for a variety of 
reasons, we find difficult to discuss directly. Those parts of our 
experience which have been or are seen as somehow unfit for direct 
reference include death and aspects of war, sex and genitalia, 
menstruation, pregnancy and excretion.
‘Taboo’, therefore, will be applied in this thesis to the widely accepted 
rules, imposed by society, by which we are constrained to some extent 
regarding the language used to refer to those subjects which cause 
general unease. They do not explicitly forbid particular types of 
language, but regulate our linguistic behaviour through conscious or 
unconscious rules present in our society. They are, therefore, vital 
elements in the structure and social life of our culture, allowing us to 
conceal those elements of our experience which we prefer to keep 
private, and maintain a level of verbal interaction with which we feel 
comfortable. It could be argued that the taboo surrounding death
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allows us to live more successful and happy lives, without a constant 
awareness of our own inevitable death and that of others.
Diachronic study of the language relating to death in English reveals 
that euphemism has always been a major constituent of the field. 
Although outside the scope of this thesis, there is a great deal of 
evidence for a corresponding situation in different languages and in 
periods pre-dating the birth of English.
Gross (1985:203) reports the words of the philosopher Vladimir 
Jankelevitch, expressing a sentiment which is evident in the language 
of many cultures, past and present:
Is not the word death above all others the unpronounceable, 
unnameable, unspeakable monosyllable that the average man, 
conditioned to compromise, is obliged to shroud modestly in 
proper and respectable circumlocutions?
Griffin (1985:32-43) discusses euphemisms in ancient Greece and 
Rome, where the subject of death, perceived to be the greatest insult, 
was highly productive of evasive language. The metaphors behind the 
items cited by Griffin (1985:33-34) - FALLING, MIGRATING, 
DEPARTING, YIELDING TO NATURE, PAYING DEBTS, 
BREATHING OUT and FALLING ASLEEP are all present in 
English (see ch.3). This fact, revealing as it does a high level of 
continuity in the way in which death has been perceived by inhabitants 
of the western world, suggests a very basic need, surviving millenia 
of cultural change, to avoid direct reference to death.
Burchfield (1985:13-30) provides evidence to show that the Anglo- 
Saxons and their predecessors felt the desire to avoid ‘sceandword’ - 
‘bad’ or ‘inauspicious’ words. This includes the history of die itself 
(see also pp.81-82). During the OE period, swefan, sweltan and 
steorfan (themselves thought to be euphemistic in origin) along with
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the periphrasis wesan dead, were most commonly used to mean ‘die’, 
although it is widely believed that *degan, the predecessor of die, 
existed at least in early OE. The absence of *degan, cognate with ON 
deyja , from OE literature is almost certainly due to taboo and 
resulting avoidance. It appears in early ME literature in the form 
degen, either revived, or adopted from Norse.
Vernon Noble (cl982:56) alludes to the earliest known English 
euphemisms for death which appear in the Anglo Saxon Chronicle.
He provides the following examples4:
[annal] 100: In this year Simon the apostle was crucified, and John 
the evangelist fe ll asleep in Ephesus.
[annal] 101: In this year Pope Clement passed away.
[annal] 509: In this year St. Benedict the abbot, the father of all 
monks, went to heaven.
[annal] 798: In the same year the body of Wihtburh was found quite 
sound and free from corruption at Dereham, fifty-five years after 
she departed this life.
The metaphors involved in these - FALLING ASLEEP and 
DEPARTING/GOING ON A JOURNEY - are both euphemistic 
resource areas in PDE; the latter is particularly prevalent. There are 
a number of early Christian euphemisms for death in Beow ulf 
including the periphrasis (1.2469) Godes leoht ceosan [lit. ‘choose 
God’s light’]. Burchfield comments that it is difficult to ascertain to 
what extent, if at all, OE, and even more recent words, were 
euphemistic at the time of their use, due to insufficient contexual 
evidence. For example, the verb (ge)cringan (related to PDE cringe) 
‘to fall in battle, to die’ may have been contextually euphemistic in 
OE, since it formerly meant ‘to curl up’, but it is difficult to ascertain 
when the change in meaning occurred. Ullmann (1957:212) writes:
The precise connotations carried by a word in past ages are 
often difficult to determine, and the more remote the age, the
4 The italics are mine.
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more hazardous the operation becomes.
C onnotation, incidentally, and denotation, are defined by Samuels 
(1972:52) as follows:
...common meanings (denotations) are accepted by all competent 
speakers of a language, individuals possess or develop new private 
links (connotations) between forms and their referents
Another question raised by Burchfield (1985:15-16) is whether forms 
such as Godes leoht ceosan can properly be regarded as euphemisms 
or simply as poetical variants. In this thesis, ‘euphemism’ is defined 
in the broad sense of any form which has undergone extension and is 
used to avoid explicit reference to a taboo topic, so poetical variants 
meeting this criterion are acceptable. However, these are not 
included in the field according to the Historical Thesaurus 
classification since they do not appear as single items in the relevant 
dictionaries (O.E.D. (1989) and the Anglo Saxon Dictionary (1898)).
The way in which euphemisms arise is by a similar process of lexical 
extension to that of metaphors. The difference lies in the relationship 
between the original conceptual area and that entered by extension.
In the case of metaphorical extension the conceptual area entered is 
perceived as similar to, although recognized as different from, the 
original area. In the case of euphemistic extension the conceptual 
area entered is also perceived as ‘better’ than the original area. An 
example is the common DEATH IS A JOURNEY metaphor, seen, for 
instance, in pass away, whereby the concept of ‘journey’ is perceived 
as preferable to that of ‘death’(p.34).
In the case of euphemism, the motivation behind the extension will 
tend to be the desire by the speaker to avoid tabooed words and use 
instead words with less unpleasant associations. A euphemism can, 
therefore, be perceived as a variant form selected for its ‘weaker’ or
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less explicit semantic properties than those of the alternative forms 
available to the speaker. Samuels writes (1972:53):
In lexis, overstatement (exaggeration) could be regarded as 
corresponding to strong-stress phonological variation, and 
similarly understatement and euphemism would correspond to 
weak-stress phonological variation. The difference lies in the 
selection of discrete forms possessing "stronger” or "weaker" 
semantic (not phonetic) properties.
For example, once the euphemism pass away came to be implemented 
by the speech community it was selected in situations requiring 
indirect rather than direct reference to death. Regular use of a 
weaker form than that which is, in a sense, required, leads in time to 
a ‘devaluation’ of semantic content, whereby a form becomes more 
and more associated with the topic to which it is commonly used to 
refer and thereby loses its euphemistic content. Similarly, 
dysphemism, discussed below, is regarded by Samuels as akin to 
exaggeration - those variant forms selected for their ‘stronger’ 
semantic properties than those required for simple denotation.
Regular implementation of a dysphemism can lead to a similar 
devaluation whereby the form loses its dysphemistic quality and the 
potential for replacement is created5.
We noted above (p.23) the impact that extension of a form to a new 
meaning has on both or all of its meanings, as Samuels (1972:52) 
observes:
The term ‘extension’ will be used here broadly, for any process 
by which the use of a form is extended to a larger number of 
meanings or grammatical functions than it has hitherto 
possessed, its information-value being thereby reduced.6
5 An example o f devaluation of a dysphemistic form might be a mother 
on a railway platform telling her daughter, "If you fall onto the track 
and kill yourself, I'll murder you!"
5 The italics are mine.
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In the case of extension to a euphemistic meaning, however, the 
tendency for the euphemism to rapidly become the central meaning of 
a form at the expense of an earlier meaning or meanings, limits 
ambiguity and enables the form to maintain a relatively high 
information-value. For example, Allan and Burridge (1991:23) 
write:
There is a wealth of evidence that where a language expression 
is ambiguous between a taboo sense and a non taboo sense its 
meaning will often narrow to the taboo sense alone.[...] The 
British still use cock to mean ‘rooster’ ; however, because of the 
taboo homonym meaning ‘penis’, this sense of cock started to 
die out in American in the early nineteenth century; it is 
nowadays very rare in Australian.
We see numerous forms in the semantic field ‘Death’, extended from 
a previous, literal meaning to the taboo meanings related to dying, for 
example demise, which was, according to the OED'i, first used by 
Shakespeare to mean:
Conveyance or transfer of an estate by will or lease
and in 1754:
Transferred to the death or decease which occasions 
the demise of an estate, etc.; hence, popularly, = 
Decease, death.
This demonstrates extension based on what Taylor (1995) calls the 
‘co-occurrence of domains’. We can assume that the form demise 
would habitually occur in the context of legal discussions denoting the 
transfer of property after the death of the owner, so that demise 
would come to be associated with the event of death. The regular co­
7 All the following dictionary definitions and quotations are taken from 
the OED .
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occurrence of the ‘domains’, or conceptual areas, of ‘transfer of 
property’ and ‘death’ would eventually enable demise to be used to 
denote ‘death’ without ‘transfer of property’, since, once a form is 
extended to refer to a taboo concept, its literal denotation is unlikely 
to survive. The reason for this is that a shift occurs in the literal 
meaning whereby it comes to include associations of the extended 
meaning and is no longer capable of simple denotation. The extension 
of gay to mean ‘homosexual’ has, for example, resulted in, or at least 
hastened the obsolescence of the earlier ‘lively and happy’ meaning.
We also see within the field ‘Death’ examples of forms borrowed 
from other languages in their extended meanings and sometimes also 
in their literal meaning, so that extension of the form has not taken 
place within the English vocabulary system but prior to its entering 
the system. Of decease, a French loanword first recorded in c l 330, 
the OED writes:
In its origin [decease is] a euphemism and still slightly 
euphemistic or at least less harsh and realistic than 
death;...
The ‘euphemistic origin’ of the form in English is due to its adoption 
from French. It may have been a euphemism in French prior to 
adoption and borrowed as such. On the other hand, it is possible that 
decease was perceived and used as a euphemism largely because it had 
entered the language from French, as opposed to some other 
language, due to the prestige of the French nation and language 
during this period (see pp.86-93). Of course, many of the words 
borrowed from French at this time were non-euphemistic, but were 
perceived nonetheless as relatively sophisticated due to their French 
provenance. In the taboo domain of ‘death’, the desire for such 
‘semantically weaker’, less explicit forms of expression, is 
particularly strong.
Expire, it would appear, was borrowed in both its literal and its 
euphemistic meanings. Also a French loanword, it was first used in
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English in a 1400, according to the OED, to mean ‘die’ and then in 
1590 to mean ‘breathe out’. The editor comments that the former 
(apparently earlier) meaning is a special use of the latter (apparently 
later) meaning. It is unlikely, given the substantial difference 
between the dates, that this is simply a case of failure to find or 
record a given meaning until after it has been transferred. It is more 
likely in this case that the word was borrowed twice from French in 
the two distinct meanings which it possessed in that language (one 
literal and one euphemistic). Otherwise, it may have possessed only 
one (literal) meaning in French but was attributed euphemistic 
connotations on its initial borrowing into English.
We have seen that euphemism arises through extension, but that we 
can distinguish between intrasystemic and extrasystemic euphemistic 
extensions in ‘Death’ as in other areas of the vocabulary. Demise, 
transferred in English to a euphemistic meaning, is an example of 
intrasystemic development. Decease and expire, borrowed from 
French in their euphemistic meanings, are both examples of 
extrasystemic development. A less significant way in which 
euphemisms are created intrasystemically is by analogy on existing 
forms, as appears to be the case with pass away based on the pre­
existing pass meaning ‘die’ (see p.97-99).
Dysphemism
Dysphemistic, as well as euphemistic, language surrounds taboo areas. 
Allan and Burridge (1991:26) define it as follows:
A dysphemism is an expression with connotations that are 
offensive either about the denotation or to the audience, or 
both, and it is substituted for a neutral or euphemistic 
expression for just that reason.
A dysphemism, for example snuff it meaning ‘die’, is, like a 
euphemism, an extended form used to refer to something regarded as 
taboo. Dysphemisms, however, do not ‘prettify’ taboo topics as
euphemisms do; they tend rather to emphasise their vulgar or 
amusing aspects, and achieve this by drawing the extended forms 
from domains which are perceived as vulgar rather than elevated. 
With the original domains of metaphors for ‘death’ there appears to 
be a continuum from ‘physical’ to ‘spiritual’ whereby we can say that 
dysphemisms tend to be more ‘physical’ and less ‘spiritual’ and 
euphemisms are more ‘spiritual’ and less ‘physical’. For example, the 
DEATH IS A JOURNEY euphemism (pass on) finds correlation 
between the act of moving from one place to another and either the 
ascension of the spirit from the body or the absence of the deceased 
from the world of the living. The concepts utilised as dysphemisms 
are, by contrast, often concerned with the physical events peripherally 
associated with death, for example DEATH IS RESIDENCE 
UNDERGROUND (push up the daisies, six fee t under), DEATH IS 
NAKEDNESS (pop one’s clogs) and DEATH IS THE DEATH 
RATTLE (croak).
All metaphorical extension requires a degree of creativity for its 
actuation, since there needs to be a perception of two things as 
similar, which are in fact, different - a link which is often exploited 
for humorous effect in the case of dysphemisms. Our present century 
has been a particularly fruitful time for new dysphemistic expressions 
for ‘death’, a point which is discussed in chapter 3 (pp.78-80). Many 
of these appear to parody euphemistic expressions, for example, buy 
the farm, get one's wings and join the choir invisible. Allan and 
Burridge (1991:26) discuss this category thus:
The following terms for menstruation are hardly euphemisms, 
on the other hand they are not unquestionable dysphemisms 
either: have the curse, woman’s complaint, be feeling that way, 
o ff the roof, and so on. We therefore dub them dysphemistic 
euphemisms for some occasions (and straight dysphemisms on 
others, such as when a man is whinging about the sexual 
unreceptiveness of his female partner).[...]With dysphemistic 
euphemisms, the locution [form] is dysphemistic, but the 
illocution [message] is not.
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Many of the highly metaphorical dysphemisms and occasionally the 
euphemisms we use, might also be described as ex travagant usages. 
By this I mean that they never come to be part of the vocabulary 
structure, but are used, perhaps widely, for a relatively short period 
of time before becoming obsolete. These often either originate from 
or are propagated by the media, particularly in the present day. A 
number of these were supplied by the survey (see ch.3), for example, 
fille t one's fish  meaning ‘die’, but will not be discussed further in this 
thesis due to their lack of structural significance.
Dysphemism arises through a similar process of extension to 
euphemism; a form which commonly denotes a concept from one 
domain is selected to refer to a concept in another domain, based on a 
perceived similarity between the two. It falls, however, into Samuels’ 
category of overstatement or exaggeration (1972:52) mentioned 
above (p.40):
In lexis, overstatement (exaggeration) could be regarded as 
corresponding to strong-stress phonological variation, and 
similarly understatement and euphemism would correspond to 
weak-stress phonological variation. The difference lies in the 
selection of discrete forms possessing "stronger" or "weaker" 
semantic (not phonetic) properties.
In the case of dysphemistic extension, the domain is selected, not 
because it is perceived as being ‘better’ than the concept in question, 
but because it is perceived as similar to some unpleasant aspect of it. 
Croak, for example, was extended to mean’die’ based on the 
similarity between the sound ‘croak’ and the death rattle. It was first 
recorded in c l460 with the meaning
To groan  or cry (of persons).
In 1812 the meaning ‘die’ was first recorded in a dictionary of the 
time: the meaning of croak had been extended to an action (dying) 
which involves the making of the sound ‘croak’. Its new function was
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to express the concept ‘die’ in a way which is stylistically low and 
perhaps humorous, i.e. which has ‘stronger semantic properties’ than 
those required for simple denotation.
Dysphemisms can also develop as a result of the pejorative semantic 
change of euphemisms; lexemes which were formerly euphemistic can 
become dysphemistic through habitual use. This development is 
difficult to trace, however, due to the problem of ascertaining to 
what extent the form was euphemistic in the first place. The popular 
kick the bucket might be an example of this. The bucket element is 
defined by the OED as:
A beam or yoke on which anything may be hung or
carried [perhaps adopted from OF buquet...]
During the 16th century, when the word was used in this meaning, it 
was common practice to hang pigs by the heels from the ‘bucket’ after 
having cut their throats. Kick the bucket was, therefore, a 
metaphorical form for ‘die’, referring literally to the death throes of 
a pig. It may have begun life as a euphemism and come, through 
time, to be the dysphemism we know today. It may, however, have 
been originally dysphemistic, since the death throes of a slaughtered 
pig seem an unlikely resource area for euphemism, even for our 
relatively rustic ancestors.
It is held in this thesis that dysphemism, like euphemism, performs 
the useful function of allowing us to avoid explicit reference to taboo 
topics. It tends to be seen by writers, however, as the opposite of 
euphemism, referring directly to the concept in question. Hughes, for 
example, remarks (1991:10) that taboo subjects ‘paradoxically 
encourage an opposite verbal reaction’ (or dysphemism) and that this 
is a ‘startlingly direct and shocking violation of a taboo’. Enright 
(1985: 2) discusses:
...euphemisms and their opposites, dysphemisms..[which are]
the making of things sound worse than they are...
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Adams (1985: 46), in his criticism of the over-use of euphemistic 
language, sees dysphemism as an antidote to the ‘suppression or 
evasion and therefore untruth that is the root act of euphemism’ and, 
therefore, as explicit. He writes:
Because euphemism, which is an effort to make something 
sound specially nice, implies that unless prettified it will be 
specially unacceptable, a euphemistic formation can easily turn 
into its opposite. That would be a ‘dysphemism’, a coinage 
almost as ugly as what it describes.
Gross (1985), Partridge (1970, 1984) and Spears (1981) use the label 
‘slang euphemism’ for dysphemism, a more accurate description since 
it recognizes the euphemistic nature of dysphemism. ‘Dysphemism’ is 
preferred to ‘slang euphemism’ however, since the form slang is used 
widely with a variety of meanings.
Allan and Burridge (1991) provide the most comprehensive account 
of dysphemism but, similarly, they claim (1991:26) that ‘a 
dysphemism is used for precisely the opposite reason that a 
euphemism is used’. Their account is based on the view that verbal 
exchanges are governed by concerns about ‘face’ otherwise called 
‘self-respect’. They can be either ‘face-saving’ or ‘face-losing’ 
exercises; the speaker chooses a euphemism in order to maintian 
his/her own face and that of the hearer, and a dysphemism in order to 
defend his own face and threaten that of the hearer. ‘Dysphemism’ 
seems to be used here simply as synonymous with ‘language regarded 
as offensive’, for example (1991:7):
Compare some of the possible responses to the offer ‘Do you 
want to come for a meal tonight?’
1. No, I don’t
2. I ’m sorry, I don’t
3 I’m sorry, (I’d love to but) I can’t.
Refusals and denials of any sort are potentially hazardous to
4 7
face and either of the first two responses can be used to hurt or 
offend (i.e. be dysphemistic to8) the offerer...
Such a wide definition of dysphemism is not terribly useful, although 
it might be improved by the inclusion of some notion of degree. The 
‘taboo’ refusal 1, for example, might be seen as mildly dysphemistic, 
since refusing a dinner invitation without explanation is only mildly 
taboo, whereas a doctor telling a patient that (s)he is about to kick the 
bucket would be highly dysphemistic, since irreverence towards the 
imminent death of another person is extremely taboo.
I hope to show in the following pages, however, that dysphemism is 
better seen as a phenomenon closely related to euphemism and used in 
particular situations for a particular effect, than as the opposite of 
euphemism. The ‘directness’ which commentators cite is more 
apparent than real, since dysphemisms allow speaker and hearer to 
avoid unpleasant topics just as euphemisms do, although by different 
means. We have at our disposal a variety of ways to talk about those 
aspects of our life which cause unease, but both euphemism and 
dysphemism allow us to make them seem other than what they really 
are.
We might compare pass away and snuff i t , both commonly used to 
mean ‘die’, in the following sentences:
la ) ’My brother passed away yesterday.’ 
lb ) ’My brother snuffed it yesterday.’
2a)’Did you know that someone snuffed it in this cellar 20 
years ago?’
2b)’Did you know that someone passed away in this cellar 
twenty years ago?’
Both the euphemism passed away and the dysphemism snuffed it seem
8 My italics
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appropriate in the ‘a’ sentences but not in the ‘b ’ sentences. The 
reason for this is that the sentences differ in tenor, defined by Wales 
(1989:456) thus:
Tenor involves the relationships between participants in the
situation, their roles and status.
In sentences la) and lb) ‘my brother’ implies a close relationship 
between speaker and situation, and justifies the use of ‘gentle’, 
euphemistic language and not the seemingly harsh language of lb). 
‘Someone’ and ‘twenty years ago’ in sentences 2a) and 2b) imply 
distance between the speaker and the situation, so the euphemistic 
passed away seems unnecessarily indirect. It is often implied, for 
example by Adams (1985), Enright (1985) and Hughes (1991), that 
euphemism is inherently appropriate for discussing taboo subjects 
whilst dysphemism is inherently inappropriate, but we can see that the 
appropriateness of both dysphemism and euphemism depends heavily 
on the context in which the words are spoken9.
An example of a situation in which euphemisms for death are often 
regarded as ‘offensively indirect’ is in the speech of politicians 
concerning the death of servicemen in military conflict. During the 
Gulf War, the U.S. Government used the term collateral damage to 
refer to dead soldiers and, during the Falklands War, soft-skinned 
targets was used to designate the enemy. The avoidance of explicit 
reference to death in these cases, motivated as it is by political 
considerations, offends those who feel that such deaths should be fully 
recognized.
Allan and Burridge (1991) stress the importance of context to 
descriptions of language as either euphemistic or dysphemistic. They 
argue, however, that it is fair to say that there are many lexical items 
that are, in ‘normal’ circumstances, always either euphemistic or
9 The extended context should also be taken into account, e.g. 2a) would 
clearly be inappropriate if addressed to someone who has recently been 
b e r e a v ed .
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dysphemistic, since, as competent speakers of English, we are able to 
designate many lexical items one or the other depending on whether 
or not they would be appropriate in an imagined situation (1991:21):
...it would ignore reality to pretend that ordinary people do not 
speak as if some expressions are intrinsically euphemistic - for 
instance, loo is euphemistic, whereas shithouse is not. What 
seems to be meant by this is that, in order to be polite to a 
casual acquaintance of the opposite sex in a formal situation in a 
middle class environment, one would normally be expected to 
use the euphemism rather than its dispreferred counterpart(s). 
When we describe some expression as a euphemism, without 
reference to the context of its use, this is what we have in mind.
This set of criteria, or ‘appropriateness test* for euphemism will be 
used throughout this thesis to assist the designation of lexical items as 
euphemistic, often with little contextual information. Similarly, an 
‘inappropriateness test’ can be devised as the criterion for 
dysphemism, as follows:
The item(s) one should not choose if one wants to be polite to a 
casual acquaintance of the opposite sex in a formal situation in a 
middle class environment.
Of course, it will sometimes be the case that the speaker will intend to 
offend the hearer(s), and in this case the item in question should be 
selected. Nevertheless, when dysphemisms are felt by either or both 
speaker and hearer to be offensive, the inappropriateness test has been 
failed. An appropriateness test should also be possible for 
dysphemisms if, as I wish to argue, they are appropriate in certain 
situations. This might be:
The item(s) one should choose if one wants to discuss a taboo 
topic at a basic or humorous level with (a) hearer(s) one 
believes will not take offence.
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The assertion that the dysphemistic form snuffed it is appropriate in 
sentence 2a) might appear to be a denial of the existence of a taboo 
surrounding death, since the speakers apparently break the rules of 
the taboo without guilt or condemnation. Readers are reminded, 
however, that ‘taboo’ is understood in this thesis, not as an absolute 
prohibition, but as a complex, subtle and general set of rules (pp.35- 
36), and that language regarding taboo subjects may be inappropriate 
in some situations but not in others; we are constrained by the facts of 
the situation in which discourse takes place.
Gross (1985:209) imagines a conversation between two people 
concerning a casual acquaintance who has died in which they use the 
form kick the bucket to describe the event. This is not a ‘startlingly 
direct and shocking violation of a taboo’, as Hughes (1991:10) would 
have it; it is simply that, in the words of E.M. Forster, the speakers 
have ‘invested their emotions elsewhere’ (Gross, 1985:210). The 
speakers are not, we can assume, closely emotionally attached to the 
deceased, and are not overheard by anyone who is, so that there is no 
personal or social pressure to be euphemistic. By using kick the 
bucket, no serious thoughts of mortality are evinced and the 
conversation can progress without solemnity to other topics. 
Dysphemism has, therefore, allowed the speakers to discuss death and 
at the same time evade the awful reality of death; that is, it is a 
euphemistic strategy.
We can conclude that dysphemism shares with euphemism the 
following characteristics:
Function: the dysphemism acts as an evasive tool, used to 
refer to taboo subjects.
Intention: use of dysphemism allows the speaker to evade the 
central element(s) of the topic to which (s)he refers.
Effect: the hearer is made aware that no serious, direct
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reference to the topic is being made and is therefore unlikely to 
consider the topic in its harsh reality
The ways in which dysphemism differs from euphemism are as 
follows:
Contextual appropriateness: the contexts in which the two 
can be used as evasive tools differ. As we saw in the examples 
above, the solemness of death can, in some situations, be 
avoided by the use of dysphemism, whereas in others the same 
form will be regarded as highly offensive. Similarly, 
euphemism can help to avoid explicit reference to death, but 
can in certain contexts seem inappropriately, even offensively, 
indirect.
Intention: dysphemism tends to be used in order to provoke 
humour regarding the taboo topic.
Effect: the hearer is likely to understand that the reference to 
death is evasive and also jocular. The effect of hearing a 
dysphemism may, in fact, be less shocking than that of a 
euphemism, since we are accustomed to connect euphemism 
with events which uspet us and dysphemism with events from 
which we are further removed.
In summary, dysphemism is a euphemistic device whereby direct 
reference to a topic perceived as taboo is avoided through use of a 
form, made available through extension, which directly refers to a 
peripheral, unpleasant aspect of the concept in question, and to the 
central concept only metaphorically. The domain from which the 
form is extended tends to be a physical event associated with the 
concept, and this focus on the physical, slightly ridiculous aspects of 
the topic gives dysphemism its ‘vulgar’ and often humorous effect. 
Dysphemisms seem harsher than their euphemistic alternatives 
because they employ concepts which are themselves unpleasant, such 
as ‘being underground’ in push up the daisies:; but, in doing so, the
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central concept is avoided, as is the case with euphemism. The 
imaginative effort involved in the creation of many of these 
dysphemisms highlights the desire of the speaker to be evasive and the 
ability of the hearer(s) to understand him/her in this way.
Taboo and ‘swearing’
There is a third category of language which proliferates around taboo 
areas, although not in the area of ‘death’ in PDE, which will be called 
in this thesis ‘taboo’ language, but which might be recognized as the 
set of ‘swear words’. Taboo words are those lexemes perceived to 
refer too directly to a taboo topic for polite use. Like euphemism and 
dysphemism, they originate in metaphorical extension, but a shift 
occurred at some point in their history due to the word being 
increasingly associated with the taboo topic to which it has been used 
to refer. The shift narrows the meaning of the form and renders it 
‘inappropriate’ almost independent of context, since the form itself 
has become taboo. Samuels (1972) might say that these lexemes have 
the ‘strongest semantic properties’ of all (see p.40), and this, of 
course, tends to be the motive behind their use. There is an overlap 
between taboo and dysphemistic language - taboo language is 
dysphemistic in effect and dysphemism refers ‘coarsely’ to taboo 
subjects - and, perhaps for this reason, some writers, including Allan 
and Burridge (1991), Andersson and Trudgill (1990), and Burchfield 
(1985), fail to distinguish between them. It is useful to maintain a 
distinction, however, since the considerable narrowing undergone by 
taboo language allows it to be perceived as differing in degree from, 
i.e. semantically ‘stronger’ than, dysphemistic language in most cases. 
We might compare:
a) He didn’t fuck her until their wedding night.
b) He didn’t get his leg over until their wedding night.
Both fuck  and get one's leg over refer ‘inappropriately’ to the taboo 
sexual act, but any competent speaker of English would agree that 
sentence b) would be appropriate in many more situations than
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sentence a).
Once tabooed, the word itself comes to be regarded as, not only 
referring directly to a topic under taboo, but as inherently taboo 
itself. An early example of widespread avoidance and replacement of 
a word regarded as inauspicious is that of the reconstructed Proto- 
Indo-European word *rksos, meaning ‘bear\ replaced by the ancestor 
of PDE bear, which, at the time of its adoption, meant ‘brown one’.
A similar replacement took place in all the Germanic and Slavonic 
languages - those spoken in the areas in which the bear is known to 
have been at large centuries ago. Hughes (1991:8) makes the 
following interesting suggestion:
Given the totemistic aura of the animal amongst the Germanic 
peoples, it is a possibility that the heroic name Beowulf, 
literally ‘bee-wolf’, might be a coded reference to bear.
Lehmann (1962:206), commenting on the process by which the 
euphemisms replacing these tabooed words, lose their metaphorical 
connotations through time and come to refer directly to the concept, 
comments:
When members of a society consider it essential to use a 
circumlocution for a tabooed term, it may change entirely to 
the new meaning. ‘Bear’ is scarcely ‘the brown one’ for any 
speaker of English today.
In the case of bear, the process of continual replacement by 
euphemisms of lexemes which have lost their euphemistic quality (see 
also p.40) does not occur. This may be due to the fact that the 
adoption of bear coincided with the process of the extinction of the 
animal in northern Europe, an event which naturally rendered it less 
fearsome, and its name less likely to become taboo.
I mentioned above that, although ‘swear’ words proliferate around the
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main taboo areas (particularly sex and excretion), they are entirely 
absent from the field ‘Death’. I wish to argue in this thesis (see also 
ch. 4) that the development of the language used to discuss death has 
been affected, to some extent, by the anxiety aroused by death itself; 
an anxiety which is stronger than that aroused by any other of the 
taboo areas (Becker, 1973:9):
...the fear of death is indeed a universal in the human condition. 
To be sure, primitives often celebrate death [...] because they 
believe that death is the ultimate promotion [...]. Most modem 
Westerners have trouble believing this any more, which is what 
makes the fear of death so prominent a part of our 
psychological make-up.
Perhaps the depth of our fear of death, concealed for the most part by 
euphemistic or dysphemistic language, prevents the development of 
the most explicit type of language in this area.
Hughes (1991:24) writes:
Our ignorance about the origins of several of the major swear­
words is one aspect of the problem of suppressed or buried 
evidence. However, an analysis in terms of origin is revealing. 
It gives the lie to the popular misconception (which is 
perpetuated even in academic circles) that the "four- letter 
words" are exclusively Anglo-Saxon in origin.
While it is true that the terms ‘Anglo-Saxon’ or ‘four-letter word’ are 
in danger of being indiscriminately applied to swear words in an 
attempt to justify their use in the face of opposition, there are a few, 
including shit, turd and arse which are certainly Anglo-Saxon in 
origin. The origins of one of the semantically ‘strongest’ words in 
English - fuck  - are unfortunately uncertain. It may be connected to 
Latin pugnare ‘to fight’. Alternative theories are suggested by 
Hughes (1991:27):
Eric Partridge [...] in his lively etymological dictionary Origins 
(1977) makes much of the relationship between Latin futere 
(the root of French foutre  ["to fuck"]) and Latin battutere, "to 
strike". The curious forms windfucker (for windhover) and 
Scots fucksail (for foresail) suggest yet another potential root in 
ON fukja  "to drive", in this case "to be driven by the wind".[...] 
In English alone we can see [...] the link [...] in the slang terms 
for sexual intercourse bang, knock and the recently fashionable 
bonk.
Once tabooed, a form, or at least the form used in its taboo meaning, 
may become obsolete, but, as Lehmann (1962: 206) writes:
...words are more commonly restricted through taboo to 
certain contexts than led to extinction.
This is no doubt because, as I have argued, we need to be able to 
choose from a range of alternatives, the form that will best suit not 
only our precise meaning but also the context of our utterance. 
Despite the taboo surrounding death, we do not want always to be 
gentle and respectful when discussing death - the human mind 
requires greater variety of expression than this.
An important factor leading to the ‘tabooing’ of words in English was 
the post-Conquest influence of French. The contact between the two 
languages, as is well known, led to the influx of French forms into 
English, resulting in a large number of (near-)synonyms; there were 
50 synonyms for ‘die’ in use between 1200 and 1400, according to the 
Historical Thesaurus. This thesis views the influence of one language 
upon another in terms of systems in contact; the system of the English 
vocabulary receives new elements from that of the French vocabulary 
and attempts to regulate itself in order to cope with the impact. 
Samuels (1972:65) describes the systemic regulation resulting from 
contact thus:
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Language possesses no pure synonyms, and this fact is not 
likely to be accidental. As Bre~al remarked (1897)...’the 
memory does not willingly burden itself with two mechanisms 
working concurrently towards one and the same end’. If, for 
extralinguistic reasons such as cultural borrowing or foreign 
conquest, two exact synonyms exist for a time in the spoken 
chain, either one of them will become less and less selected and 
eventually discarded, or a difference of meaning, connotation, 
nuance or register will arise to distinguish them.
The relative cultural sophistication of the French in the post-Conquest 
period, combined with the fact that France was the conquering nation 
and imposed its nobility upon the English, meant that the French 
language and the words adopted from it were perceived to be more 
sophisticated than the native alternatives and tended to occupy the 
higher registers of English. Therefore, as suggested by Samuels 
(1972), some potential synonyms, in this case those coming from 
French, tended to be differentiated from native synonyms through 
their occupation of a higher register. This comparative sophistication 
was, no doubt, the motive behind their selection over English 
alternatives, particularly during the 13th century, by which time 
English speakers used French words to signal their social standing.
A complementary and simultaneous process of differentiation took 
place in that the meaning of many native words became narrower and 
more explicit in order to survive. The French forms were perceived 
as relatively prestigious not only because they had been adopted from 
French but also because they tended to be used with relatively ‘wide’ 
meanings, corresponding with a process of narrowing in English 
words. There was, therefore, differentiation in two directions 
simultaneously, at least in those areas of the language where 
vagueness or delicacy might be required.
This process of differentiation through narrowing enabled many
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native words to survive French impact, which otherwise might have 
been, as Samuels writes, "less and less selected and eventually 
discarded" (see p.57), by producing meanings fit for different 
functions. The result was a host of lexemes with comparatively 
explicit meanings without the sophistication of the French 
alternatives. As we have seen (p.53), narrowing tends to result, in 
taboo areas, in the lexemes in question coming to be seen as referring 
too directly to unpleasant subjects, and therefore becoming 
linguistically tabooed.
The imposition of a linguistic taboo will be a result of extralinguistic 
events, such as the subject in question, for some reason, coming to be 
seen as more anxiety-provoking , as must have been the case at some 
time in history with words meaning ‘bear’ (see p.54). The Victorian 
period is, of course, most notable for the placing of taboos on words 
in the modern era (see also ch.4), and, consequently, during this 
period, a large number of new euphemistic and dysphemistic 
expressions for discussing death appeared. It could indeed be argued 
that the language of death underwent a process of 
overlex icalization  during this period, a term referring to the 
presence in a language of an abundance of synonyms for a particular 
concept, the substance of which, nevertheless, tends not to be 
satisfactorily addressed. During the 19th century the Historical 
Thesaurus records 31 new forms synonymous with die, compared to 
17 in the 18th century and 13 in the 20th century.
The proliferation of words for ‘death’ should not, however, be taken 
to indicate that the Victorians were more comfortable with the idea of 
death than either their predecessors or successors. As Wales 
(1989:331) comments:
Overlexicalization occurs in a language when a particular
concept or a set of concepts are of vital concern to a culture.
This concern manifests itself, not only in the amount of literature 
dealing with death, but also in the sentimentality with which death
58
tends to be treated, as well as in extralinguistic developments such as 
the adoption of the wearing of black clothes for mourners and the 
inception of the undertaking profession.
A taboo on a particular linguistic item might be lifted by a releasing 
mechanism of some kind, allowing the word to be used more freely. 
Burchfield writes (1985:26):
...wave after wave of social prudery at times drove the more 
explicit terms into retreat, while other social mechanisms 
brought them back in use and also generated hard-core words.
It has been argued, e.g. by Gorer (1965:171), that the first half of the 
twentieth century witnessed the creation of what he calls ‘the 
pornography of death’, whereby the language surrounding death 
became very heavily tabooed. The second half of this century, 
however, has seen a breaking down of the taboo whereby death is 
more easily and freely discussed in western culture (see ch.4). This 
linguistic development corresponds with changing attitudes towards 
death as discussed by contemporary anthropologists (for example, 
Gittings (1984, 1992), Cannadine (1981) and McManners (1981)). 
These changes have enabled words which would formerly have been 
judged taboo to be used in a wider variety of contexts.
Neutral language
We have considered so far the categories of euphemistic, dysphemistic 
and taboo language. There is a final category used to discuss taboo 
topics, called neutral language in this thesis, which lacks the 
metaphorical content of euphemism and dysphemism. The ‘core’ 
words of the semantic field ‘Death’ - death, dead and die - fall into 
this category. The effect of using neutral, like euphemistic and 
dysphemistic, language, depends on the context in which it is spoken. 
It might, in certain situations, have a more dramatic effect on the 
hearer than dysphemism, commonly believed to be the most shocking.
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Consider, for example, sentence 2a) above (p.48):
2a)’Did you know that someone snuffed it in this cellar 20 
years ago?’
The speaker, free from pressure to be euphemistic, could use either 
neutral or dysphemistic language. (S)he uses the dysphemistic snuff 
it, we can assume, in order to create some kind of effect, probably 
humorous or dramatic. As competent speakers of English, we know 
that this is not a word which we are expected to take seriously; it is 
used to elicit emotions very different from those that would 
accompany the intimation that the death of a loved one, for example, 
had occurred. Perhaps the speaker avoids using language which is 
direct, such as die, precisely because it is this ‘neutral’ language, 
devoid of metaphor, which most openly confronts the reality of the 
anxiety-provoking subject of death.
Summary
1) This chapter viewed semantic change in terms of lexical 
extension.
2) We discussed the principles - actuation, implementation and 
diffusion - which are present in all types of change.
3) We identified metaphorical transfer as the principal type of 
change in the semantic field ‘Death’ and distinguished euphemistic 
transfer from the closely related phenomenon of dysphemistic 
transfer.
4) We have seen that the taboo surrounding death is a major cause 
of change in this field, giving rise to metaphorical language with 
which it might be discussed.
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Chapter 3 
ANALYSIS OF FIELD
This chapter will consider the theory put forward in the preceding 
chapters as it pertains specifically to the semantic field ‘Death’. The 
material falls into two sections as follows:
P a r t 1: A breakdown of the field in terms of the metaphorical
clusters (see p.34) used to discuss death.
P a r t 2: A detailed study of three central lexemes - starve, decease
and pass away.
Part 1: Metaphor in the field ‘Death’ 
Preliminaries
The field, as classified by the Historical Thesaurus, will not be 
reproduced and examined in its entirety due to restrictions of space. I 
believe, in any case, that the omitted sections are of little relevance to 
this study; the items contained within them, for example death-rattle 
and death-rate, depend chiefly for their formation on the central 
elements of the field listed below. I have, however, included a 
number of items, not in the Thesaurus classification, which I collected 
myself. I decided to undertake this task as I became aware that a 
number of items in common use today were missing from the field, a 
situation which will no doubt be addressed both before the completion 
of, and in following supplements of, the Historical Thesaurus. My 
method for a relatively quick and effective way of finding this 
information was to produce a survey (reproduced in the appendix 
(pp. 102-103)), and distribute it amongst the first-year students of 
English Language at Glasgow University in 1995, a class which 
contained approximately 300 students, around 10% of whom were 
mature students, as well as relatives and acquaintances of all ages and 
regional and social backgrounds. As a result, once again, of 
restrictions of time and space in the writing of this thesis, the
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implications of the survey results cannot be explored in full. I have, 
however, kept the information and it may prove useful for further 
work in this area.
The response, particularly in the area of verbs meaning ‘die’ was 
excellent; in many cases the same items were provided repeatedly by 
participants of different ages and from different backgrounds. I 
accepted only those items which were given repeatedly (at least three 
times) in order to avoid accepting as significant an item which existed 
only in the idiolect of an individual. Items gathered by means of the 
survey are marked ‘s ’.
My methodology for the first part of this chapter will be as follows.
I will look firstly at all of the nouns meaning ‘death’ followed by all 
of the verbs meaning ‘die’ recorded by the Historical Thesaurus and 
my survey. I will begin by identifying the metaphor utilised in the 
meaning of each of the items, except those designated ‘neutral’ which 
are believed to have no metaphorical content. I will then designate 
each of the items believed to have metaphorical content either 
‘euphemistic’ or ‘dysphemistic’ and compare the results from each of 
the word-classes in the year 1400 with those of the year 1950 with the 
intention of demonstrating that this area of the language has 
developed from predominantly euphemistic to predominantly 
dysphemistic. Finally, I will comment on the significance and 
continuity or lack of continuity of each of the metaphors used in the 
noun and the verb classes.
There are a number of problems involved in such a study, both 
inherently and due to the restrictions of my methodology, which 
should be identified before commencing. Firstly, it is often difficult 
to discern the connotations with which obsolete words, or words 
having undergone semantic change, were used, as Ullmann 
(1957:212) writes (see also pp.38-39):
The precise connotations carried by a word in past ages are
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often difficult to determine, and the more remote the age, the 
more hazardous the operation becomes.
This makes the tasks of deciding whether a lexeme has or has not 
undergone metaphorical extension and of designating lexemes 
‘euphemistic’ or ‘dysphemistic’ more problematic. The difficulty of 
‘pinning down’ the precise meaning of a word, never mind its 
connotations, is ultimately due to the fact that the categories or slots 
of meaning occupied by words, including the variational space 
surrounding each lexeme which contains all of its potential changes 
(see also pp 23-24), have ‘fuzzy’ boundaries and are constantly 
changing. Given the fuzziness of meanings of words themselves, it 
would be foolish to hope for complete precision in a study of these 
meanings. The difficulty of separating the ‘euphemistic’ from the 
‘dysphemistic’ items is also due to the euphemistic nature of 
dysphemisms and the ease with which euphemisms can become 
dysphemistic (see p.40).
I am restricted in a number of ways by my methodology which is in 
turn restricted by the limited time and space permitted in the writing 
of this thesis. In order to identify metaphors which are not 
transparent, I have depended on dictionary evidence about the 
etymology and prior meanings of the word, occasionally resorting to 
native-speaker intuition. To designate lexemes ‘euphemistic’ or 
‘dysphemistic’, I used a combination of factors. Firstly, I considered 
the conceptual area employed by the metaphor; whether or not it 
would be perceived as sufficiently ‘better’ than death to perform a 
euphemistic function (see p.39). I looked at the OED quotations for 
every item, together with any editorial comments supplied. I also 
considered Allan and Burridge’s (1991) formula (p.50), combined 
with comments made by the participants in the survey and, where 
appropriate, my own experience of the language.
As regards the study of the proportion of euphemisms and of 
dysphemisms at different points in time, it might be the case that the 
dependence chiefly upon written record might bias the results in
63
favour of euphemism for the medieval period and dysphemism for 
the modern period. We should, therefore, be aware that the literature 
of the two periods differed widely in quantity and range. The 
relatively small body of literature of the 15th century was dominated 
by religious material and romances, whereas by the 1950s, a vast 
range of genres and styles existed and almost anything deemed worthy 
could be written and published. This does not mean, however, that 
the results of the comparison are insignificant. Various types of 
literature did exist in 1400 (the first year chosen for our study): not 
long before this date Chaucer had incorporated a host of ‘vulgar’ and 
humorous expressions into his poetry. Also, I would argue that the 
literature of any period does reflect the spoken language, at least the 
standard variety if one exists, to a considerable extent. We should not 
necessarily assume that the language was more like Present Day 
English than the evidence suggests.
In the light of these comments, however, it will not surprise the 
reader to find that the results in columns three and four are not 
intended to be conclusive. They are, however, as accurate as the 
methodology, limited by time and space, would allow, and provide a 
true, if general, description of the field.
I begin in Table 3.1 with nouns meaning ‘death’, including those listed 
under the sub-heading ‘general loss of life’, felt to be very closely 
related in meaning to, and perhaps interchangeable with synonyms for 
death. There then follows an analysis of the results of the study. I 
continue in the same vein in table 3.4 with verbs meaning ‘die’. The 
number in brackets beside each heading, for example ‘Death 
(010202)% is the number of that section in the Historical Thesaurus. 
The first two columns of the table - the forms and their dates of use - 
are extrapolated from the Historical Thesaurus. The forms are listed 
chronologically, apart from those forms occurring only in OE, which 
are listed alphabetically. In the third column I have tried to identify 
the metaphor employed in the meaning of the form in order to 
measure the significance and continuity of each.
6 4
In the fourth column I have designated the meanings of the forms 
neutral, euphemistic or dysphemistic on the basis of the metaphor 
used and the contextual information provided by the dictionary 
quotations. Some items are labelled ‘euph-neutral’ or ‘euph-dysphem’ 
when the meaning is thought to have developed from euphemistic to 
neutral or dysphemistic, and ‘euph/neutral’ or ‘euph/dysphem’ when 
the form is felt to be used in both ways during the same period.
Key to abbreviations and conventions
Abbreviations consisting of two letters appearing next to dates of use 
are those used by the Historical Thesaurus, originally designated by 
the OED. They are as follows:
ai: archaic
au: Australian/Aboriginal 
cf: chiefly 
cq: colloquial 
dl: dialect 
in: ironical 
li: literary
The sign between two dates means that the word was in use 
between them. The same sign after a final date means that the word is 
in current use. The sign V  appears between two dates when they are 
separated by a period of over 150 years and the word was not in use 
during this period. Brackets around the final date means that there is 
reason to believe the word was used after that date.
na: nautical
nz: New Zealand/Maori 
rr: rare 
sc: scots 
si: slang
us: United States
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Metaphor in nouns meaning 4death9 (010202)
Table 3.1
FORM DATES OF 
U S E
M ETAPH O R N E U T R A L /
E U P H E M ISM /
D Y SPH E M ISM
bealusip OE departure (of spec, 
(hateful) kind)
euphemism
cwealm OE destruction/violent death euphemism/
neutral
cwealmbealu OE destruction/violent death euphemism/
neutral
deapes lip OE cup of death euphemism
deapgedal OE separation (of body and 
soul) 
mortality
euphemism
deaplicnes OE euphemism
deapscua OE shadow of death euphemism
deapscufa OE shadow of death euphemism
deapwege OE cup of death euphemism
ealdorbealu OE end (of life) euphemism
ealdorgedcd OE separation (from life) euphemism
ellorsip OE journey euphemism
ende OE end euphemism
endedeap OE end euphemism
endelif OE end euphemism
endestcef OE end euphemism
fcer OE journey euphemism
feorhcwalu OE end (of life) euphemism
feorhcwealm OE end (of life) euphemism
feorhgedal OE separation (from life) euphemism
feorhlegu OE loss (of life) euphemism
ferhpweg OE journey euphemism
forpferednes OE journey euphemism
forpfering OE journey euphemism
forpfor OE journey euphemism
forpgeleorednes OE journey euphemism
forpsige OE journey euphemism
forpw eg OE journey euphemism
fripgedal OE separation (from life) euphemism
gastgeckil OE separation (from soul) euphemism
gehror OE destruction/ruin euphemism
geonsip OE journey euphemism
hingang OE journey euphemism
hinsip OE journey euphemism
hryre OE destruction/ruin euphemism
lads ip OE departure (hateful) euphemism
geleorf ed)nes OE journey euphemism
lichryre OE loss (of body) euphemism
lifgedal OE separation (from life) euphemism
morpcwalu OE violent death euphemism/
neutral
neosip OE departure (of spec, kind) euphemism
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niedfaru OE
nydgedal OE
sawolgedal OE
sip OE
sw ylt OE
swyltdeap OE
tofser OE
tolysnes OE
utsip OE
wselweg OE
gewitednes OE
woruldgedal OE
hen( en)sith< OE-cl200
heononsip
forthsithe<forpsip OE+al240
souling<sawlung OE-cl440
ending<endung OE-cl485
death<deap OE-
forthfare C1205
way-sith c l  205
life ’sAive’s end c l 205-1830
fall cl205-
fine c 1250-1556
dying 1297-
starving al300-cl440
parting a1300-1857
end cl305-
depart C1330-1742
decease cl330-
perishing al340-
finishment c 1340-1873
obit C1375-1694
last end 1377-1611
resolution 1382-1582
passing forth 1387
carrion 1387-1481
departing 1388-1633
passage 1390-1693
trespass e merit C1400-1475
sesse 1417
cesse 1419
latter end 1422+1630-1710
departison cl450-cl475
department c 1450-1477
dbrmition 1483+al656+1849
-(1869)
debt of/to nature 1494-(1812)
passing 1512+1869-
dissolution 1522-(1856)
expiration 1526-1807
funeral 1575-1705
transmigration 1576-1675
dissolving 1577
departance 1579
passage 1645-1827
disanimation 1646
passover a 1662
journey (compulsory) euphemism
separation (compulsory) euphemism
separation (from soul) euphemism
journey euphemism
neutral
neutral
journey euphemism
releasing euphemism
journey euphemism
journey euphemism
departure euphemism
separation (from world) euphemism
journey euphemism
journey euphemism
separation (from soul) euphemism
ending euphemism
neutral
journey euphemism
journey euphemism
ending euphemism
falling euphemsim
ending euphemism
neutral
becoming rigid euph-neutral
departure euphemism
ending euphemism
departure euphemism
departure euphemism
perishing euphemism
ending euphemism
falling/perishing euphemism
ending euphemism
separation euphemism
journey euphemism
putrefying flesh dysphemism
departure euphemism
departure/joumey euphemism
departure euphemism
end euphemism
end euphemism
end euphemism
departure euphemism
departure euphemism
sleep euphemism
paying debt euph-dysphem
departure/joumey euphemism
separation/end euphemism
breathing euphemism
burial euphemism
journey euphemism
separation/end euphemism
departure euphemism
journey/departure euphemism
loss of life euphemism
j oumey/departure euphemism
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launching into eternity 1669 joumey/departure euphemism
finis 1719-1871 end euphemism
perch 1722 si falling (off bird’s perch) dysphemism
demission 1735 releasing euphemism
demise 1754- transference of property euphemism
translation 1760-(1878) transference euphemism
transit 1765-0859) joumey/departure euphemism
dropping 1768 falling euphemism
expiry cl790- breathing euphemism
departal 1823 departure euphemism
snuffing out 1922 extinguishing candle dysphemism
fade-out 1939- fading (from domain of 
cinematography)
dysphemism
the last round up 1932-0940) meeting (from domain 
of driving cattle)
dysphemism
an appointment in 1933- meeting (personification euph-dysphem
Samarra of death)
the big/endless sleep s sleep euphemism
curtains s closing curtains 
(theatrical metaphor)
dysphemism
.general loss of
life (010202/071
cwealmbairnes OE violent death/ 
destruction, ruin
euphemism/
neutral
feorhcwalu OE end of life euphemism
feorhcwealm OE end of life euphemism
feorhlyre OE loss of life euphemism
lifleast OE loss of life euphemism
liflyre OE loss of life euphemism
morp OE mortality euphemism
ofercwealm OE mortality euphemism
quale<cwalu OE-cl205 violent death/destruction euphemism/
neutral
qualm<cwealm OE-C1386 violent death/destruction euphemism/
neutral
wal<wcel OE-cl205 violent death/destruction euphemism/
neutral
mort C1330-
1536+1560sc
mortality euphemism
murrain 1387-al632 mortality euphemism
mortality c 1400-(1863) mortality euphemism
loss o f life 1582- loss of life euphemism
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Table 3.2
Metaphors in verbs meaning ‘die’ (010202)
FORM
acwelan 
adeadian 
asteorfan 
asweltan 
aswindan 
becwelan 
belifan 
beon gelogod to his 
folcum  
(ge)cringan 
*deagan 
diegan 
(ge)dreosan 
geendian 
gefeallan 
feorh agiefan 
feorh gesellan 
feorh losian 
geferan 
feranforp  
gast onsendan 
glidan 
hweorfan 
leoran 
lif geendian 
lirrnan ealdre 
(ge)losian 
o pew elan 
sawlian 
tostencan 
towitan 
uncetnessa gebidan 
gewitan o f lice 
befall<befeallan 
i-wite<gewitan 
forswelt< forsweltan  
quelle<cwelan 
to go o f  life < o f life 
forthfare < forpfaran 
fare<faran 
swelt<sweltan
be dead<dead 
forfere <fotferan 
(lead<deadian 
wite<witan 
wend (forth, 
hence, etc,)< wen dan
DATES OF 
U S E
OE
OE
OE
OE
OE
OE
OE
OE
OE 
OE 
OE 
OE 
OE 
OE 
OE 
OE 
OE 
OE 
OE 
OE 
OE 
OE 
OE 
OE 
OE 
OE 
OE 
OE 
OE 
OE 
OE 
OE 
O E +cll60  
OE-cl205 
OE+al225 
OE-al250 
OE-cl250 
O E +all75-cl350  
OE+cl 175-1377 
OE-
cl300+cl375dl-
OE-1388
OE-14(X)
OE-cl425
OE-C1480
OE-1567
M ETA PH O R
perishing 
failing, decay
perishing 
loss (of life)
yielding (in battle)
falling 
end 
falling 
loss (of life) 
loss (of life) 
loss (of life) 
journey 
journey 
separation (from soul) 
journey 
journey 
journey 
end (of life) 
loss (of life) 
loss (of life)
separation (from soul) 
journey 
journey 
loss (of life) 
journey 
falling 
journey 
perishing
journey
journey
journey
journey
journey
journey
N E U T R A L /
E U P H E M IS M /
D Y SP H E M ISM
euphemism
euphemism
euph-neutral
euph-neutral
euphemism
neutral
euphemism
euphemism
euphemism
neutral
neutral
euphemism
euphemism
euphemism
euphemism
euphemism
euphemism
euphemism
euphemism
euphemism
euphemism
euphemism
euphemism
euphemism
euphemism
euphemism
neutral
euphemism
euphemism
euphemism
euphemism
euphemism
euphemism
euphemism
euph/neutral
neutral
euphemism
euphemism
euphemism
neutral
neutral
euphemism
neutral
euphemism
euphemism
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go/depart out o f this OE-C1588
world<gan
starve <steo?fan OE-al657
to give up the OE-
ghost<gast agiefan
die c l 135-
wend to/into cl200-cl480
(heavan/hell/ bliss)
let (one's) life cl 200-1577/87
end C1200-1858
to-swelt cl 205
to-worth c l 205
a-deadan cl230
aswelt cl230-cl300
yield  (up) the cl290-
ghost/soul/breathAife 1627+1844ai-
take the way o f death 1297
flee a 1300
leave one’s breath a 1300
take (one’s) fine a 1300
die up al 300-1563/87
spill al300-1592
pass (hence) a1300-
shed (one’s own) al300-
blood
tine/leave/lose the C1320-1513
sweat
leese one’s life-dawes c l 325
part hence cl325
do (one’s) fine cl 330
miscarry a1340-1749
trance 1340-al500
flit 1340-1619
determine c l 374+1607
pass away C1375+1806-
disperish 1382
be gathered to one’s 1382-
fathers/ people
shut one’s life 1390
go 1390-
fine al400
part o f this life a 1400
sye hethen/of life a1400-a 1400/50
tine al400-cl475+
1570sc-
expire al400-
seek out o f life cl400
pass the ghost C1400-1621
leave one’s life C1400-1635
go west C1400-
have the death cl435
decease 1439-(1868)
ungo c l 450
expire the soul cl450-1715/20
take the death cl470
espire 1483
pay the debt o f nature 1494-( 1812)
vade 1495-al678
journey euphemism
become rigid euph-neutral
separation (from soul) euphemsitic
neutral
journey euphemism
loss (of life) euphemism
end euphemism
perishing euphemism
perishing euphemism
neutral
perishing euphemism
separation (from 
soul/life)
euphemism
journey euphemism
journey euphemism
breathing euphemism
end euphemism
perishing euphemism
loss (of vital fluid) euph/dysphem
journey euphemism
loss (of vital fluid) euphemism
loss (of vital fluid) euphemism
loss (of life) euphemism
journey euphemism
end euphemism
journey euphemism
journey euphemism
journey euphemism
end euphemism
journey euphemism
perishing euphemism
meeting euphemism
closing euphemism
journey euphemism
end euphemism
journey euphemism
journey euphemism
perishing euphemism/neutral
breathing euphemism
journey euphemism
separation (from soul) euphemism
departure euphemism
journey euphemism
neutral
journey euphemism
perishing euphemism/neutral
breathing euphemism
neutral
breathing euphemism
paying debt euph-dysphem
fading euphemism
7 0
depart 1501-
decease this world 1515
trespass 1523
galp up the ghost 1529
vade away 1530-1625
trespass this life 
end one’s days
al533
al533-
die the death. 1535-
change one's life 1546
je t 1546
depart to God 1548
play topple up tail 1573
peak over the perch 1575-1633
inlaik cl575-1785sc
finish 1578-1611
ghost al586+1689
pitch over the perch 1587
relent 1587
unbreathe 1589
pick over the perch 1591
transpass 1592
breathe one ’s last 1593-1850
(breath)
lose one’s breath 1596
walk the way o f 1597
nature
depart this life 1597-
part 1599-
go Off 1605-
go the way o f  all flesh 1609-
go away 1611
make a die (of it) 1611-(1883) si
fail 1613
drop 1654 cq&sl
pay nature’s due 1657
kick up al658+1813
cross Jordan 1684
march off 1693/4
pike off 1697
die off 1697-
go out 1697-
drop off 1699 cq&sl-
tip off al700-1735 si
knock off al704 si
vent one’s soul 1718
sink 1718-1804
launch into eternity 1720
demise 1727-(1783)rr
tip (over) the perch 1737-1808 si
slip one’s cable 1751-1868 na
turf it 1763 si
move off 1764 cq
join the majority 1764-
pop off (the hooks) 1764 si
journey euphemism
journey euphemism
journey euphemism
separation (from soul) euphemism
fading euphemism
journey euphemism
end euphemism
neutral
substitution euphemism
journey (strolling) dysphemism
journey euphemism
falling (over) dysphemism
falling (off perch) dysphemism
failing euphemism
end euphemism
separation (from soul) euphemism
falling (off perch) dysphemism
failing/surrender euphemism
breathing euphemism
falling (off perch) dysphemism
journey euphemism
breathing euphemism
breathing euphemism
journey euphemism
journey euphemism
journey euphemism
journey euphemism
journey euphemism
journey euphemism
causation of death dysphemism
failing euphemism
falling dysphemism
paying debt euph-dysphem
falling (over) dysphemism
journey (cross river) euphemism
journey (marching) dysphemism
journey (going quickly) dysphemism
journey (going one after dysphemism
another)
journey euph/dysphem
falling dysphemism
falling dysphemism
ending (work) dysphemism
releasing/separation euphemism
surrendering/failing euphemism
journey euphemism
transference o f property euphemism
falling (off perch) dysphemism
releasing (nautical) dysphemism
lying underground dysphemism
journey (laboured dysphemism
progress)
meeting euph/dysphem
falling from support dysphemism
(butchering)
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pack off 1766+1914-
fall 1780-
kick the bucket 1785 sl-
hop the perch 1791-1822
hop (off) 1797-
pass on 1804/20-
exit 1806
croak 1812 sl-
go to glory 1814 cq-
go home 1816 dl
sough away 1816 sc-
slip one's breath/wind al819-(1856) cq
stiffen 1820
drop short 1826 cq&sl
go over to the 1837
majority
drop/slip/etc. off the 1840 sl-
hooks
succumb 1849-
cash/pass/send in 1857 cq&cf us
one's checks
walk 1858 si
turn one's toes up 1860
snuff out 1865 sl&cq-
hand in one's checks 1870 us&cq
peg out 1870-
pass in one's cheques 1872-(1900) si
go bung 1882-1885 au &
nz si
pass over to the 1883
majority
go/pass to one's 1883 in&ogus
reward
stepout 1884-1903 us&sl
cash in (one's checks) 1884-
get one's/the call 1884 dl&li
snuff it 1885 sl-
perch 1886 si
end up 1886 sl-
go up the flume 1888
knock over 1892 cq & si
pass out 1899 cq-
pass over 1909-
silver cord is loosed 1911-
pip (out) 1913-1920
cop it 1915 sl-
snuff 1916 sl&cq
kick off 1921 sl&ogus-
shuffle off 1922 cq-
step off 1926 si
take the ferry 1928
off it 1930 si
cross over 1930-1935 eu
crease it 1959 si
departure (when dysphemism
dismissed)
falling euphemism
kicking dysphemism
falling (off) dysphemism
falling (off) dysphemism
journey euphemism
departure (theatrical) dysphemism
death-rattle dysphemism
journey euph/dsyphem
journey/reunion euphemism
breathing euphemism
releasing/breathing dysphemism
becoming rigid dysphemism
failing (to finish) dysphemism
meeting euph/dysph
falling from support dysphemism
(butchering)
surrendering euphemism
ending (gambling) dysphemism
journey (walking) dysphemism
becoming rigid dysphemism
extinguishing candle dysphemism
ending (gambling) dysphemism
releasing (sporting) dysphemism
ending (gambling) dysphemism
becoming useless/ruined dysphemism
meeting euph/dysphem
joumey/reward euph/dysphem
journey (walking) dysphemism
ending (gambling) dysphemism
summons euphemism
extinguishing candle dysphemism
falling (off perch) dysphemism
end (bad) dysphemism
journey (up industrial dysphemism
water channel)
fall (over) dysphemism
departure euph/dysphem
journey (from domain of euphemism
spiritualism)
releasing euphemism
defeat dysphemism
being caught dysphemism
extinguishing candle dysphemism
kicking/departure dysphemism
departure (allusion to dysphemism
Hamlet, III i 67)
journey (walking) dysphemism
journey (of spec, type) dysphemism
departure dysphemism
journey euphemism
being drained dysphemism
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kiss off 1970 si
bite the bullet/big one s
bite the dust s
bow out s
buy it s
buy the big one s
buy the farm  s
cash in one’s chips s
check out (of that s
great hotel they call 
life)
clock out s
cop one’s whack/ lot s
croak it s
cross over s
cross the great divide s
drop/fall off one’s s
perch
fa ll asleep/go to sleep s
go fo r an early s
shower
go to a better place s
go to heaven s
(go to) meet one’s s
maker
go to the g r e a t  in s
the sky
go/pass/cross to the s
other side 
join the choir invisible s
meet Saint Peter s
pop one's clogs s
push/kick up daisies s
reach the end (o f the s
line)
rung/slip down the s
curtain
shuffle off/depart/ s
leave this moral coil 
swim /cruise the Styx s
turn/curl up one's s
toes
being killed dysphemism
being killed dysphemism
fall (down) dysphemism
departure (theatrical) dysphemism
obtaining dysphemism
obtaining dysphemism
obtaining dysphemism
ending (gambling) dysphemism
departure dysphemism
departure (from work) dysphemism
being caught dysphemism
death rattle dysphemism
journey euphemism
journey euphemism
falling of perch dysphemism
sleep euphemism
departure (sports) dysphemism
journey euphemism
journey euphemism
meeting dysphemism
journey
(formerly
euphemistic?)
dysphemism
journey
(formerly
euphemistic?)
euphemism
meeting (parody of dysphemism
euphemistic language)
meeting (familiar) dysphemism
becoming naked dysphemism
lying underground dysphemism
ending euphemism
closing curtain dysphemism
(theatrical)
departure euphemism
journey dysphemism
becoming rigid dysphemism
A number of the items in both noun and verb classes might be 
described as extravagant usages (see p.45). An example might be 
appointment in Samarra. It was first recorded, according to the 
OED, by Somerset Maugham in his play ‘Sheppey’, where the 
character ‘Death’ states that he has an appointment with another 
character (who later dies) in the Iraqi town of Samarra. It has since
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been transferred to mean ‘inevitable disaster’ and is almost certainly 
obsolete in its meaning ‘death’, but in the interim it was used by 
writers following Maugham as an extravagant means of denoting 
‘death’.
Summary of analysis of metaphors
In his study of euphemisms, Ayto (1993:233) proposes the following 
list as the successful metaphors operating in the language of death in 
English today:
1) Death as rest or some other form of non-consciousness
2) Journey/leaving
3) Summons
4) Loss for those who knew the deceased
5) End
OE - PDE
We can see from our study that the metaphors of ‘journey’, ‘end’ and 
‘loss’ have remained consistently popular, although ‘loss’, contrary to 
Ayto’s (1993) view, is more commonly the loss of life or of vital 
fluid for the deceased than ‘loss for those who knew the deceased’. 
We should add to Ayto’s list the following metaphors we have found 
to be commonly used: ‘separation’, ‘meeting’, ‘releasing’, ‘perishing’ 
and ‘mortality’. ‘Perishing’ and ‘mortality’ or ‘liability to die’ are 
closely related in meaning to ‘death’ but are nonetheless metaphorical 
when used to mean ‘death’ or ‘die’. The metaphors of ‘failing’ and 
‘surrendering/yielding’ appear in OE and reappear commonly in 
PDE. ‘Closing’ appears in OE and is revived in PDE in the ‘closing 
curtains’ metaphor. ‘Falling’, present in OE, becomes very common 
in PDE with the added dysphemistic elements of ‘falling off a perch’ 
or ‘tumbling over’. Similarly, ‘becoming rigid’, present in the 
originally euphemistic steorfan (see pp.81-82), is used 
dysphemistically in PDE forms.
7 4
OE - M E
The rather grim metaphors of ‘destruction/violence’, and ‘putrefying 
flesh’ used in Old and Middle English, are entirely absent from PDE. 
This may be due in part to changes in attitudes towards death. The 
evidence suggests (see ch. 4) that our ancestors were less squeamish 
than ourselves about the physical facts of death, and it may be that it 
was possible to use euphemistically in OE concepts that could only be 
used dysphemistically in the modern period. The ‘cup of death’ and 
‘shadow of death’ metaphors, probably representative of poetic 
themes of times past, are likewise obsolete.
PD E
Both kick the bucket and kick q/f use the metaphor ‘kicking’, 
probably inspired by the death-throes; the metaphors of ‘the death- 
rattle’ ‘becoming naked’ ‘burial’ and ‘lying underground’ also appear. 
A number of PDE metaphors make only one appearance in our study; 
the verb make a die o f it, contains the metaphor which I have called 
‘causation of death’; its rarity perhaps stems from the 
..inappropriateness of perceiving the act of dying as something we 
might voluntarily do. Also unique is the metaphor of ‘becoming 
useless/ruined’ which appears to lie behind the Australian English go 
bung, and the metaphor of ‘being drained’ in crease it. The metaphor 
of ‘substitution’, seems to stem from the idea of changing one kind of 
life for another, and its confinement to PDE is perhaps due to its 
omission of the idea of progress from this life to the next, a concept 
integral to medieval eschatology. The ‘extinguishing candle’ and 
‘fading’ metaphors are, despite the pleasant connotations of both, felt 
to be used dysphemistically in the items above, e.g., the 1896 
quotation from the Daily News:
I have the pleasure to inform you that your mother-in-
law snuffed it.
The metaphors of ‘summons’ and ‘sleeping’, contrary to Ayto’s 
(1993) view, and reportedly popular in other languages, appear to be
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rarely used in English, although a visit to a graveyard will reveal that 
‘falling asleep’ is a euphemism which commonly appears on 
tombstones. The discrepancy in this case is, therefore, one of 
register; the ‘sleeping’ metaphor is restricted to a domain - 
‘tombstone inscriptions’ - which is not represented by the OED.
The metaphors of ‘defeat’, ‘being caught’ and ‘being killed’ reveal a 
perception of death as the enemy. On the other hand, the metaphor 
which I have called ‘obtaining’, seen in popular contemporary 
metaphors such as ‘buy the farm’ and ‘bought it’, implies 
achievement. The ‘obtaining’ metaphor appears to be exclusively 
dysphemistic, however, and probably ironic, mocking the ambitions 
people harbour for their retirement.
The next stage will be a comparison of words meaning ‘death’ and 
‘die’ in the year 1400 with those used in 1950 in order to illustrate the 
increased presence of dysphemism in this area of the language. The 
first date was selected as a time at which we would expect a 
particularly high ratio of euphemism due to the huge number of 
French loan-words entering the language (see pp.86-90). The year 
1950 is expected to show a far higher incidence of dysphemisms, for 
reasons which will be discussed below (pp.78-80, 118-119).
Table 3.3
Comparison of successive states of nouns
1400 Euphem ism / 1950 Euphem ism /
dysphem ism dysphem ism
souling euphemism death neutral
ending euphemism fall euphemism
death neutral dying neutral
life ’sAive’s end euphemism end euphemism
fall euphemism decease euphemism
fine euphemism perishing euphemism
dying neutral passing euphemism
starving euphemism departure euphemism
parting euphemism quietus euphemism
end euphemism demise euphemism
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depart euphemism thirty dysphemism
decease euphemism fade-out dysphemism
perishing euphemism the last round-up dysphemism
finishment euphemism an appointment in 
Samarra
euph - dysphem
obit euphemism loss o f  life euphemism
last end euphemism the big/endless sleep
(s)
euphemism
resolution euphemism curtains (s) dysphemism
passing forth ■ euphemism
carrion dysphemism
departing euphemism
passage euphemism
trespassement euphemism
mort euphemism
murrain euphemism
mortality euphemism
Table 3.4
Comparison of successive states of verbs
1400 Euphem ism /
dysphem ism
1950 E u p hem ism /
d y sp h em ism
forfere euphemism give up the ghost euphemism
dead neutral die neutral
wite euphemism pass (hence) euphemism
wend (forth/hence) euphemism shed (one’s own) euphemism
blood
go/depart out o f this euphemism pass away euphemism
world
starve neutral be gathered to one’s 
fathers/people
euphemism
give/yield up the euphemism go west euphemism
ghost
die neutral depart euphemism
wend to/into euphemism end one’s days euphemism
heaven/hell/bliss
let (one’s) life euphemism die the death neutral
end euphemism breathe one’s last euphemism
die up euphemism depart this life euphemism
spill euphemism part euphemism
pass (hence) euphemism go off euphemism
shed (one’s own) euphemism go the way o f all flesh euphemism
blood
tineAeave/lose the euphemism cross Jordan euphemism
sweat
miscarry euphemism die off dysphemism
trance euphemism go out dysphemism
flit euphemism drop off dysphemism
determine euphemism join the majority euph/dysphem
be gathered to one’s euphemism pop off (the hooks) dysphemism
fathers/people
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go euphemism
fine euphemism
part o f  this life euphemism
sye hethen/of life euphemism
tine euphemism
expire euphemism
seek out o f life euphemism
pass the ghost euphemism
leave one’s life euphemism
go west euphemism
pack off dysphemism
fa ll" euphemism
kick the bucket dysphemism
hop (off) dysphemism
pass on euphemism
croak' dysphemism
go to glory euphemism
drop/slip off the dysphemism
hooks
succumb euphemism
cash/pass/send in dysphemism
one’s checks
snuff out dysphemism
peg out dysphemism
go/pass to one’s euph/dysphem
reward
cash (in) dysphemism
get one ’s/the call euphemism
snuff it dysphemism
end up dysphemism
pass over euphemism
cop it dysphemism
snuff it dysphemism
kick off dysphemism
shuffle off dysphemism
step off dysphemism
take the ferry dysphemism
off it dysphemism
cross over euphemism
crease it dysphemism
kiss off dysphemism
In order to conserve space I have not reproduced the verbs collected 
by the survey again here, but the reader can see from table 3.2 that 
there are 30 items; 22 dysphemisms and 8 euphemisms.
Summary of study of euphemism and dysphemism
We can see that the language of 1950 in this area is more heavily 
dysphemistic than that of 1400. In 1400 there are 25 nouns in use 
meaning ‘death’, 22 of which are euphemistic to varying degrees, two 
of which are neutral and one of which is dysphemistic. In 1950 there 
are 17 nouns, 10 of which are euphemistic, 5 of which are 
dysphemistic and 2 are neutral. In 1400 there are 31 verbs in use 
meaning ‘die’, 28 of which are euphemistic and three of which are 
neutral. In 1950 there are 72 words meaning ‘die’ counting the 
survey items, 32 of which are euphemistic, 47 of which are
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dysphemistic and 2 of which are neutral.1 
Conclusions
We looked at nouns meaning ‘death’ and verbs meaning ‘die’ - the 
central section of the semantic field ‘Death’ - from OE to the present 
day. Despite the difficulties involved in such a study, I believe we are 
entitled to make the following claims:
1) We found that a small number of metaphors have been used 
consistently to structure our discussion of de^th throughout the 
history of the language. Otherwise, a few of the metaphors 
common in OE have disappeared and, in PDE, a diverse range of 
new metaphors has appeared. Often, however, metaphors common 
in OE have reappeared in PDE with added elements which render 
them dysphemistic, e.g. ‘falling’ becomes ‘falling off a perch’.
2) The most striking discovery is the difference between the 
balance of euphemisms and dysphemisms in the field in 1400 and in 
1950. In 1400 the great majority of lexemes for talking about 
death were euphemistic, whereas in 1950 the field was 
predominantly dysphemistic. In ch. 4 , 1 will argue that perceptions 
of death have changed since medieval times and suggest that this 
may have had an impact on the language. It might be suggested, 
however, that we feel our helplessness in the face of death 
particularly difficult to bear in an age in which it is generally 
believed that scientific progress has enabled us to understand and to 
do almost anything we want. Dysphemism not only allows us to 
avoid explicit reference to death, but, unlike euphemism, it enables 
us to diminish, by means of humour, the power of this formidable 
enemy.
Readers are reminded of the point made earlier that the explosion in 
printing has ensured that more words from the colloquial register, in
lrrhe numbers of euphemisms andysphemisms include those which 
might have fallen into either category.
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which dysphemistic words tend to arise, have survived, and that these 
may have been more prevalent in earlier peiods than the evidence of 
written record can tell us. It nevertheless seems safe to assume that 
the language of the earlier literature reflects, at least to some extent, 
the spoken language of the time. Although outside the scope of this 
thesis, I suspect that research in the other taboo areas of the language 
would yield similar results to this study, finding PDE far more 
dysphemistic. This suggests that it is not the changing perception of 
death alone that has led to an increase in the dysphemistic language 
used to discuss it. The factors which have encouraged this increase in 
all taboo areas of the language are difficult to ascertain, but the 
following might be contributory factors. The increased freedoms of 
the modern age have enabled and encouraged greater freedom of 
expression. And, at a more basic level, the former established centres 
of authority, most notably the church - and the hierarchical structure 
of feudal life, despite its faults, provided certainties about life and 
death which many feel are no longer possible in our secular, 
democratic age. Gorer (1965:173) writes:
...in England, at any rate, belief in the future life as taught in 
Christian doctrine is very uncommon today even in the minority 
who make church-going or prayer a consistent part of their lives; 
and without some such belief natural death and physical 
decomposition have become too horrible to contemplate or to 
discuss.
Part 2: Diachronic Studies
In this section I will give a brief description of the development of 
three central lexemes in the semantic field ‘Death’ - starve, decease 
and pass away. I have selected these lexemes in particular because 
their development exhibits features discussed in previous chapters.
For example, starve was once the normal word to express the concept 
‘die’ and has clearly undergone dramatic change. Decease and pass 
away entered English as French loan-words and now occupy central 
positions in the upper registers of the field. Whilst these studies focus 
upon individual lexemes, I have tried to reflect the fact that the
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development of each affects and is affected by the development of 
other elements of the vocabulary, especially from those within the 
field.
Starve
The central, current use of starve in PDE is defined by the OED as 
follows:
To die of hunger; to perish or be in the process of 
perishing from lack or insufficiency of food; to suffer 
extreme poverty and want; more emphatically "to starve 
to death". Also hyperbolically in colloquial use: to be 
extremely hungry.
The OE form steorfan meant simply ‘to die’, and in the following 
pages the development from the OE to the present day meaning is 
traced.
The word is believed to descend from the Teutonic root *sterb-, 
thought to have meant ‘to be rigid’. This theory is supported by the 
fact that its descendants include ON stiarfe meaning ‘epilepsy’ and 
stiarf-r/stir-finn meaning ‘obstinate’, as well as WGmc words 
meaning ‘die’, meanings which share the concept of ‘being rigid’. If 
we are to accept this, it seems possible that steorfan was originally 
euphemistic when first used in English; the concept of ‘being rigid’ 
has emerged as a metaphor for ‘die’ in PDE (see p.74).
The original use of steorfan to fill the semantic slot ‘to die’ may have 
resulted from the avoidance of *degan, ancestor of die, as a result of 
the operation of taboo in this area of the language (see also pp.37-38). 
According to writers including Bloomfield (1933:401), *degan, 
replaced the Primitive Indo-European term represented by Latin 
mori: ‘to die’. However, there is no instance of the word in surviving 
OE literature, its sense being expressed by steorfan as well as sweltan 
and wesan dead. Writers suggest two possible theories: the form may
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have been lost early in OE, as it was from Gothic and, subsequently, 
from all of the continental Germanic languages. It would then have 
been re-adopted in late OE or early ME from Norse. Otherwise it 
may have been preserved in OE in some non-standard dialect, re­
adopted into the standard in late OE. Whichever view happens to be 
true, it seems safe to say that *degan was avoided in OE and that this 
was most likely due to linguistic taboo. Avoidance of a word for this 
reason typically results in the adoption of a euphemism to fill the slot 
formerly occupied by the prohibited word. In this case, it appears 
that steorfan was the euphemism used to fill the slot and allow 
expression of the meaning ‘die’ without breaking the taboo 
surrounding it.
N arrow ing
The first recorded appearance of starve meaning ‘die’ is from 
iElffic's Homily dated c l000:
Annanias and Saphiran ...mid faerlicum dea^e aetforan 
t>am apostolum steorfende afeollon.
According to the OED, starve continued to be used in this meaning 
until al657 by which time it was most commonly used to convey the 
following:
To die a lingering death, as from hunger, cold, grief, or 
slow disease.
This is clearly a case of shift by means of narrowing; the linguistic 
category has shrunk, restricting application of the word to the types 
of death listed. This can be observed in the following 17th century 
quotation, taken from a love-poem, in which the meaning ‘pining 
away from grief’ rather than instantaneous, or any other kind of 
death, is clearly intended:
Margrait..Quho with thy eyes, (least my puir lyfe sould 
sterue), Wouchaiffes to look wt pitty on my paine.
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The shift may have been facilitated by the fact that the early meaning 
of starve could be used to suggest ‘death of the soul’, seen, for 
example in the following quotation dating from cl 175:
hole us to bi-wepen ure sunne pe t  we ne steruen noht p e r  
inne.
The second, more dramatic shift, produced the following meaning:
With various constructions specifying the cause of death. 
In later use with modified sense: To be brought gradually 
nearer to death, to be in process of being killed; to suffer 
extremely. Now only dialect.
The OED lists three types of death to which starve, in this meaning, 
could be used to refer: ‘grief, love, pestilence, and the like’, ‘cold’ 
and, first appearing in 1124, ‘hunger’:
Se man p e  aeni god heafde him me hit be raefode p e  nan 
ne heafde staerf of hungor.
Starve continued to be used in this meaning until at least 1735.
It is not difficult to imagine the reasons why starve o f hunger should 
have become a common construction at this time, when one considers 
the connection between hunger and death in the Middle Ages. 
Although death by starvation was not an everyday event for the 
people of pre-industrial England, it was not uncommon for those 
depending for food on their own efforts and at the mercy of the 
weather, as well as disease and other crises. For this reason, starve 
would often have been used in the context of death due to lack of 
food, rendering starve of/with hunger a common construction. The 
quotations indicate that, until around 1735, it was necessary to specify 
that ‘death by starvation’ was meant by starve, due, no doubt, to the 
fact that during the same period starve was also used to mean ‘die’ as 
well as ‘die of grief, love, pestilence or cold’.
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We have seen (p.25) that narrowing occurs when words are used 
habitually in restricted contexts. The use of starve in the context of 
death by hunger eventually narrowed the meaning, rendering the 
addition of o f hunger unnecessary. Another factor leading to 
narrowing is differentiation between synonyms, and there were many 
alternatives available to convey the concept ‘die’ during the period 
when the meaning of starve began to narrow; die itself came into use 
in cl 135, fairly soon after steorfan, and quickly became popular.
In the language surrounding death and dying, a factor which 
commonly encourages narrowing is taboo. Use of a form to refer to 
a topic under a taboo results in that form becoming associated with 
the taboo meaning and renders it inappropriate for meanings which 
are not taboo. It is therefore surprising, perhaps, that starve, used 
for centuries to mean ‘die’, has shifted away from its previous taboo 
meaning and continued in use. Samuels (1972:77) suggests that the 
narrowing (specialisation) of starve and its synonym sweltan was due 
to their differentiation from die in a direction determined by 
phonaesthetic factors, rather than due to the influence of taboo2:
It seems probable that sweltan and steorfan were euphemisms for 
*degan, and that they had originally in Gmc meant ‘burn slowly’ 
and ‘grow stiff’ respectively. [...] From then on swelte(n) and 
sterue(n) were specialised in the direction of their original 
meanings - swelte(n) ‘swoon or faint with heat’, sterue(n) ‘die of 
hunger or cold’, ‘starve or freeze to death’ . The very fact of their 
specialisation in these directions would appear to rule out the 
possibility of taboo as a cause of the shift; and since there is no 
trace of these special meanings in OE, it is most probably to be 
attributed to 2 factors: availability of ME deye [...], and by 
differentiation from it, specialisation of swelte(n) and sterue(n) to 
meanings that derive from the relevant phonaesthemes in ME. 
[..(p.78)..] On this view the change involves a return to the 
meanings of phonaesthemes that had to some extent existed earlier 
in Gmc.
2I will not attempt to explain the phenomena of phonaesthesia in this 
thesis. Interested readers are directed to: Reay (1991).
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There may also have been some degree of taboo influence on the 
narrowing of starve, but the predominance in this case of 
phonaesthetic factors helps to explain the form’s survival.
W eakening
The modern meaning given at the beginning of this study originated, 
in around 1578, in the use of starve as an elliptical form of starve o f 
hunger, a shift, by means of weakening, made possible by the 
narrowing of starve from ‘die’ to ‘die of hunger’. This meaning 
continued until, by 1910, it had weakened to such an extent that the 
concept ‘death’ needed to be specified:
The man was starving to death. Water he did not want.
This quotation, designated ‘emphatic’ by the editor, marks the 
beginning of another shift in the meaning of starve, whereby the 
concept ‘death’ is no longer included in the meaning of starve, and 
must be specified if intended.
Finally, the OED mentions the most recent shift, again a case of 
weakening, whereby starve is used to mean ‘to be extremely hungry’. 
This meaning, designated ‘hyperbolically colloquial’ by the editor, is 
the most commonly heard use of starve today. Samuels (1972:53) 
writes:
Though a modern instance of the verb die as in I'm dying to see 
you , may strike us as no more than an ephemeral exaggeration 
limited to certain colloquial registers, yet a parallel devaluation was 
permanent in the word starve, where the gradual weakening can be 
traced from its collocations: in ME it still meant ‘to die’ but 
especially of hunger or cold if these causes were specified (steruen 
of/for hunger).. Since 1600 it has usually had the weaker senses 
‘be on the point of dying’ or ‘suffer from extreme hunger’ and the 
older sense, if required, must be expressed by die o f hunger or
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starve to death.
To conclude: the development of starve from OE to PDE exhibits two 
main shifts - narrowing, beginning in the 15th century, followed by 
weakening, beginning in the late 16th century. This weakening 
appears to have continued to the present day, since the common 
complaint “I ’m starving” is used in almost complete synonymy with 
“I ’m hungry”.
Decease
In chapter 2 (pp.42-43, 56-58), we saw that the impact of contact with 
French, a major cause of change in the English vocabulary, can 
readily be observed in the history of the semantic field ‘Death’. After 
the Norman Conquest of 1066, French was the language of normal 
intercourse among the upper classes in England for around 200 years, 
while English remained the language of the masses.
Baugh and Cable (1993:164) distinguish two main periods of entry of 
loan-words, with 1250 as the approximate dividing line. In the 
period before 1250 the borrowings were much less numerous and 
tend to be associated in meaning with the relationship between the 
French-speaking nobility and the English-speaking peasantry (noble, 
servant, baron). In the early thirteenth century the ties between 
France and England began to weaken as a result of the loss of 
Normandy and other property in France by the English. Members of 
the English nobility of French origin either returned to France or 
remained in England as integrated citizens. National spirit improved 
as the English could begin to see themselves as wholly English, and 
there was a growing intolerance of the use of French by English men 
and women. A result of diminished contact with France and 
increased confidence in England and the English language was that in 
the years around 1250 those who had been accustomed to speak 
French were turning increasingly to the use of English. These 
speakers would naturally transfer into their English vocabulary many
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items from their French vocabulary. In fact this group of speakers 
carried over into English a vast number of commonly used French 
words - a process which reached its climax around the end of the 
fourteenth century. Decease was one of the hundreds of words 
borrowed during this period.
Baugh and Cable (1993:165) comment:
In general we may say that in the earlier Middle English period 
the French words introduced into English were such as people 
speaking one language often learn from those speaking another; 
in the century and a half following 1250, when all classes were 
speaking or learning to speak English, they were also such 
words as people who had been accustomed to speak French 
would carry over with them into the language of their 
adoption.
It is worth repeating that there was a massive increase in the number 
of borrowings during the period between 1250 and 1400 - the time 
when English was steadily replacing French all over England. This 
process, by which a large amount of the vocabulary of a language 
which is dying out is transferred by speakers into the ascending 
language, is known as language death. In this case the process was 
aided by the relative prestige of French; speakers were eager to 
integrate French words into their English speech in order to signal 
their sophistication.
L anguage contact
Samuels (1972: 92) distinguishes two types of contact that can take 
place between languages or varieties of a single language
Type A: stable and continuous contact between neighbouring 
systems that are adjacent on either the horizontal (regional) or 
vertical (social) axis;
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Type B: sudden contact, resulting from invasion, migration or 
other population-shift, of systems not normally in contact 
hitherto.
The contact between French and English during the Middle English 
period is clearly an instance of Type B resulting from the invasion 
and subsequent residence of French speakers. These are the 
circumstances which made the French vocabulary available to 
speakers of English. Samuels (1972:94) adds:
In contacts of type B, the bilinguals are usually those who learn 
the second language for reasons of prestige or livelihood - the 
subjects in a conquered country, or foreign immigrants in an 
expanding country.
In the case of the contact between English and French, native speakers 
of English - the subjects in a conquered country - used French for 
reasons of prestige. This is the major pressure which encouraged 
selection of foreign items over native items in many areas of the 
vocabulary. Even in PDE, items of French origin continue to be 
perceived as relatively prestigious - a legacy from this period of 
contact, reinforced by the enduring regard for French culture.
Readers are reminded that the structuralist position adopted in this 
thesis views a language as a system - a whole composed of parts in an 
ordered but constantly changing arrangement. The vocabulary of any 
language is a separate system within the greater system of the 
language itself, and change can arise from within that system 
(intrasystemic) or from outside it (extrasystemic). The impact of 
French during this period is, therefore, extrasystemic; foreign items 
entered the native system necessitating simultaneous reorganisation of 
its members, an activity which accelerated around 1250 and slowed 
down around 1400.
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Contact necessitates regulation of the vocabulary owing to the limit on 
the number of synonyms which can exist side by side at any one time, 
owing, in turn, to the limits on a speaker’s ability to understand and 
desire to use new words. The introduction of a new item into this 
restricted system will therefore result in one of the following events: 
the borrowed word may have (near)-synonyms in the native language 
in which case reorganisation is necessary. Otherwise, the borrowed 
lexeme may have no existing synonym in the native system in which 
case it is likely to survive without affecting other lexemes in the field. 
If the meaning of the word is an entirely new concept to native 
speakers this involves an increase in the semantic space covered by the 
vocabulary.
The following diagram is intended to illustrate the impact of a 
borrowed lexeme on the native system. Mutton was borrowed from 
French mouton meaning ‘sheep’ as well as ‘the flesh of a sheep’ in the 
late 13th century.
mouton
Form
sheep
E n g lish
French
Form Meaning
Meaning
sheep
flesh of sheep
Form
mutton
E n g lish
sheep + flesh 
of sheep
sheep
Meaning 
flesh of 
sheep
sheep
Figure 3.1 Impact of French mouton
As we can see, the borrowed lexeme was used with a different, 
narrower meaning in English. According to the Historical Thesaurus, 
mutton was the earliest word in English with the meaning ‘the flesh of 
sheep used as food’. The Thesaurus can also tell us that sheep (in
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contrast with the French system) was never used to include the 
meaning ‘flesh of sheep’. This meaning must have been lexicalized 
somehow, however, in a society which relied at least to some extent 
on sheep farming for food, so presumably some sort of periphrasis, 
such as flesh o f sheep, was used to convey the meaning. The 
availability of the new form mutton would not therefore have resulted 
in any narrowing in the meaning of sheep. It occupied the slot of 
semantic space formerly occupied by flesh o f sheep (or whatever), 
thereby fully lexicalizing a concept formerly lexicalized by 
periphrasis.
The reorganisation of meaning in this case lies in the selection of the 
‘flesh of sheep’ element of the meaning of the French loanword to 
express a concept which lacked concise expression in English, and the 
discarding of the ‘sheep’ element of mouton which already had 
adequate expression in English.
This example of the way in which the meaning of the concrete noun 
mutton altered on entry into English provides a model which is, 
unfortunately, difficult to produce for words with more abstract 
meaning such as decease. There may have been, for example, some 
change in connotation, difficult to trace now. The significance in this 
case lies in the effect of the borrowing on other members of the 
system.
Differentiation of synonyms
In c l 330 when decease meaning ‘death’ was first recorded in English, 
the Historical Thesaurus tells us that the following synonyms were in 
use:
ending, death, live’s end, fine, dying, starving, parting, end, depart
When a number of synonyms exist in the system at the same time, 
differentiation tends to occur between them (p.28). Samuels
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(1972:65) writes (see also p.57):
Language possesses no pure synonyms, and this fact is not 
likely to be accidental. As Bre~al remarked (1897) ...’the 
memory does not willingly burden itself with two mechanisms 
working concurrently towards one and the same end’. If, for 
extralinguistic reasons such as cultural borrowing or foreign 
conquest, two exact synonyms exist for a time in the spoken 
chain, either one of them will become less and less selected and 
eventually discarded, or a difference of meaning, connotation, 
nuance or register will arise to distinguish them. Only in rare 
cases can genuine free variation be said to exist, and, in those 
with which we are today acquainted it seems probable that one 
or other of the two processes just mentioned is already at work, 
though the result, for want of controlled observation, escapes 
us.
As regards synonyms for death and die, the evidence suggests that 
‘free variation’ has never existed. In the semantic field ‘Death’, 
covering as it does a taboo area of our experience, the lexemes used 
would seem to distinguish themselves mainly on the basis of register, 
depending in particular on the explicitness of the word.
Decease has remained a commonly used word, unthreatened itself by 
obsolescence, but 7 of its 9 original synonyms - ending, live’s end, 
fine, dying, starving, parting and depart - have themselves become 
obsolete. The discarding of a synonym is clearly the simplest form of 
differentiation. Between those syonyms which have remained in use 
throughout the history of decease in English we should be able to 
observe the process of differentiation. As with many of the words 
borrowed from French it is likely that decease was perceived as a 
comparatively prestigious word and was therefore incorporated into a 
relatively high register of English. The OED editor comments that it 
is:
In  its orig in  a euphem ism  (L. decessus for m ors), and
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still slightly euphemistic or at least less harsh and 
realistic than death; it is the common term in legal and 
technical language where the legal or civil incidence of 
death is in question, without reference to the act of 
dying.
Given the limitations of this thesis, it is not possible to ascertain the 
precise connotations with which particular words were used prior to 
borrowing into English, although I would hope to address this 
question in a future piece of work. The meaning of decease in 
English, however, clearly included connotations which distinguished 
it from death and other synonyms. It certainly performed, at the time 
of its earliest use in English, a euphemistic function, as it does today. 
We can suppose that the success of decease lies in its ability to be used 
euphemistically when many of its synonyms were losing the 
euphemistic connotations they once possessed. This was undoubtedly 
the main direction of differentiation between decease and its 
alternative forms, resulting for the most part in the latters’ 
obsolescence.
The question therefore arises: why was decease capable of continued 
euphemistic use when many of its rival forms lost this feature? The 
answer lies partly in the prestige bestowed by its French origins; long 
after France had ceased to have any political dominance over 
England, its cultural dominance continued and French continued to be 
perceived as a stylistically superior language. French provenance 
appears to ensure to a large extent the continued perception of 
loanwords as subtly superior to native forms This perceived 
superiority renders these forms more appropriate for expressing 
many types of meaning and doing so in a suitable register. This is 
particularly true in taboo areas where selection of forms is normally 
motivated by a desire for avoidance of direct reference to the subject.
Another reason for the ability of decease to continue to be used 
euphemistically lies in the restrictions regarding its usage. We have
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seen (p.25, 40) that habitual use of a form to refer to a taboo topic 
encourages narrowing, and therefore, increased explicitness of that 
form. Throughout its history and today, decease has been used to talk 
about death in the legal, or otherwise formal, domain. Since England 
was under French rule in the early Middle English period, a great 
deal of legal language entered English from French. Coleman 
(1995:102), on the subject of loanwords in the semantic area of 
‘marriage’, writes:
Marriage also displays a high level of early borrowing from 
French, as the use of French as a language in the practice of the law 
declined and its legal terminology was adopted into English.
This OED quotation, by way of example of the register in which 
decease tended to be used, dates from 1818:
In case his said daughter should die without issue of her 
body living at her decease.
It is likely that its restriction to a fairly formal domain acted as a 
barrier to the pattern described above whereby the form either 
becomes obsolete or narrowing occurs and the form becomes 
incapable of euphemistic use. The special context in which use has 
occurred has prevented excessive narrowing, enabling the meaning of 
decease to retain its breadth, and, therefore, its indirectness.
Pass away
Pass away, perhaps the most popular euphemism for ‘die’ today, was 
borrowed from French and used in English with the two meanings 
‘depart’ and ‘die’. In the following pages we will look at the 
development of pass away, in order to discover why the form 
continued in its taboo, rather than its literal, meaning.
The form was first used to mean ‘die’, according to the OED , in
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cl375, and ‘depart’ in al425. These dates present an apparent 
contradiction to the normal pattern of extension from literal to 
metaphorical meaning. There are two possible explanations: either 
the literal meaning was used earlier in English but no record of it 
survives, or the form was borrowed twice from French in each of its 
meanings (see also p.43). It appears that pass away was, at any rate, 
polysemous - a condition under which ambiguity can arise.
A m bigu ity
Ambiguity can arise when the same or similar forms can be used to 
convey different meanings. In chapter 2 (p.27) we saw that it is one 
of the factors which leads to semantic change, and that this occurs in 
the direction of regulating the ambiguity between meanings.
Polysemy can, however, exist without resulting ambiguity: there is 
rarely, if ever, confusion between the two common meanings of bear 
( ‘type of animal’ and ‘carry’) because they are clearly differentiated 
by membership of different word-classes, that is, they occupy 
different grammatical slots. For polysemy leading to ambiguity 
which hampers effective communication, there must be significant 
similarities as well as differences between the meanings in question.
In the case of pass away, the meanings shared a number of elements as 
well as occupying similar grammatical slots, allowing the form to be 
used in broadly similar circumstances and therefore rendering it 
ambiguous. We can demonstrate these similarities by means of 
com ponential analysis (see p.95), an approach to the description 
of meaning of words which rests on the following thesis (Lyons, 
1977:317):
...the sense of every lexeme can be analysed in terms of a set of 
more general sense-components (or semantic features), some or all 
of which will be common to several different lexemes in the 
vocabulary.
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Shared components  of  pass away
Form pass away
M eaning ‘depart’ ‘die’
C om ponent ACT (OF PERSON) ACT (OF PERSON)
BECOME ABSENT 
FROM WHERE ONE 
ONCE WAS
BECOME ABSENT 
FROM WHERE ONE 
ONCE WAS
GO ELSEWHERE GO ELSEWHERE
Figure 3.2 Shared components of pass away
Ambiguity is not always an unwanted feature of language, since the 
speaker does not aim always and only for effective communication of 
a message. Ambiguous meanings of a form are regularly permitted 
to coexist for long periods of time, especially when concerned with 
taboo topics. In the language surrounding sex, for example, 
ambiguity between literal and extended meanings is often exploited 
for humorous or erotic effect. Cock, avoided in American English 
(Allan and Burridge (1991) and p.41), survives in both its literal and 
taboo senses in British English, providing in its ambiguity the basis 
for many jokes.
Incom patib ility  of m eanings
The problem with the ambiguity of the meanings of pass away lies in 
the difference between and, more importanly, the incom patibility  
of, the meanings. In the following table and *+’ represent the 
negative and positive values of the meaning component ‘cease to be
95
alive’.
Form
M eaning ‘depart’
pass away
‘die’
+ CEASE TO BE ALIVEC om pon en t - CEASE TO BE ALIVE
Figure 3.3 Components not shared by pass away
The difference in meaning between ‘departing’ and ‘dying’ is such 
that we want to be able to readily discern which meaning is intended. 
For this reason, our language system could not long tolerate a form 
which could equally well mean either. Samuels (1972:65) writes:
If a form has two meanings - whether as the result of polysemy or 
homonymy so incompatible that they cause ambiguity, one of the 
meanings dies out, or, more rarely, the form itself becomes 
obsolete.
L im ita tion  of am biguity
Samuels (1972:64) uses the term lim itation for the process by which 
ambiguity is regulated. He writes:
Avoidance of ambiguity means that of all the alternative forms 
available to a speaker, whether in grammatical paradigm or lexical 
set, he selects only those that are clearest and least likely to give 
rise to ambiguity, i.e. in each of the many acts of selection 
necessary for the utterance, he must prefer some forms and reject 
others.
The process of limitation, whereby one meaning is selected and the 
other rejected, appears to have occurred in the development of pass 
away. Interestingly, the literal, not the taboo meaning continued in
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use for around 300 years; the taboo meaning disappeared after its 
initial use in c l 375, re-emerging in the 19th century. The following 
diagram describes this process of limitation:
Form  t1 M eaning t2
pass away literal —» taboo
F orm  M eaning t3
pass away literal
taboo
F orm  M eaning t4
pass away literal
Figure 3.4 Pattern of limitation in pass away
The obsolescence in this case of the extended rather than the literal 
meaning would suggest the influence of some other linguistic 
phenomenon than taboo. In the case of starve (p.84) we discovered 
phonaesthetic influence, in the case of pass away it may have been 
analogy with similar forms having similar meanings.
The word pass, adopted from French, was first recorded in English in 
the sense:
To go, proceed, move onward. Of spiritual destination; 
esp. in to pass to God, heaven, etc.
Its first appearance is in a manuscript of the Ancrene Riwle, dated 
al225:
p e t  we moten burh rudi scheome passen to p e  heouene.
This quotation demonstrates that the meaning of pass was very close
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to ‘die’, recorded in the Cursor Mundi in a!300.
p e  ... wittes five ...all sal be tint er saul pas.
The ‘die* meaning was used alongside the ‘depart’ meaning from the 
13th century onwards. We can identify two distinct lines of 
development in the meaning of pass (see figure 3.5):
Form
passer (French)
I
pass (English)
M eaning M eaning
a1225 Go, proceed, move onward
(of spiritual destination)
1297 Go on, move forward, 
proceed
al400  Of things: to pass out of
existence, come to an end, 
cease to be, perish.
Figure 3.5 Lines of development of pass
Pass is closely related to pass away, not only formally, but in the 
development of its meanings. It is possible that the early use of pass 
away meaning ‘die’ was supported by its similarites with pass and 
other related forms. We have observed, for example, that the 
DEATH IS A JOURNEY metaphor has always been highly productive
in this area of the language. In use at the time were:
forfere , wend forth/hence, go/depart out o f this world, wend to 
heaven, pass (hence) and flit
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Use of pass hethen in the same text (Lay Folks Mass Book, Ms. B) in 
which pass away first appears, is evidence that, not only was pass 
available to mean ‘die’ (as we already know), but that it could be 
combined with an adverb to convey the sense of ‘go elsewhere’.
Given the brief appearance of pass away in the 14th century, it is 
possible that it was originally an extravagant usage - a metaphor 
which was unusual at the time of its use (see p.45), and failed to 
become structurally significant until later. It may also have been 
restricted to use in a particular context: the quote we are given is 
taken from a mass book prayer. These factors might help to explain 
why the taboo meaning had a limited effect on the literal meaning 
‘depart’ which was able to continue in regular use after the former’s 
obsolescence.
The second quotation for pass away meaning ‘die’ provided by the 
OED is dated 1806, around 400 years after the first. The MED, 
however, records a usage from a Northern MS. of the Pricke o f 
Conscience, dated al425, which tells us that the lexeme continued to 
be used in at least this variety of English until at least this date.
TIM E FORM
OE
pass away 
ME 4
PDE i
Figure 3.6 Obsolescence and re-emergence of pass away
It may be significant that during the period in which pass away 
meaning ‘die’ was re-introduced, the majority of available synonyms 
were dysphemistic. There was, in fact, an influx of dysphemistic
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words entering this area of the vocabulary - of the 10 new lexical 
items synonymous with die which appear in the 2nd half of the 
century, the following 8 are dysphemistic:
slip one's cable, turf it, move off, pop o ff (the hooks), pack off, 
kick the bucket, hop the perch and hop (off).
Pass away was, therefore, reintroduced during a period in which the 
majority of its synonyms were highly dysphemistic, and its 
appearance perhaps encouraged the process by which its synonyms 
became more dysphemistic by way of differentiation from it.
Samuels (1972:67) comments on this kind of process, using the 
example of silly:
...such words [new synonyms] may enter the system for other 
reasons and it would therefore be equally possible to regard the 
great extension in the meanings of silly as due to differentiation 
from these words, which could have been exact synonyms to the 
meanings of silly when they entered the system.
We have observed that there is a strong need for euphemistic 
language, and also that lexemes which were originally euphemistic 
tend to become less so through habitual use. Pass away, then, appears 
to have filled a slot of meaning ( ‘die’ with suitably euphemistic 
connotations) which seemed in danger of becoming empty.
Functional pull
The process by which ‘empty’ slots attract forms, is known as 
functional pull (Samuels, 1972:67 and p.37).
...if one of the meanings of a word is discarded because of 
ambiguity [...] and there is no new form that is encroaching on the 
area of the lost meaning, a new slot-filler may arise from 
borrowing or creation, or the ‘pull’ of the empty slot may hasten a
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new process of extension in another existing word.
In the case of pass away there are a number of possible reasons for its 
selection to fill the slot. It may have survived in dialect throughout 
the years of its suspected absence, to be borrowed back into the 
standard in the 19th century. It may have been extended anew from 
the literal ‘depart’ meaning. Support for either process would have 
been provided by the existence of closely related forms, for example, 
the extension of pass on to mean ‘die’ is dated 1804, only two years 
before the reappearance of pass away.
Pass away, like decease, appears to have retained its ability to be used 
euphemistically despite regular use. Today it is regarded by many as 
the most appropriate synonym for compassionate, respectful 
reference to dying. Gross (1985:205) attributes its success to two 
factors. Firstly, the concept of ‘passing away’ implies an easy 
transition: there is no dramatic wrench away from this life.
Secondly, there is no specified location, so its appropriateness does 
not depend on one's eschatological beliefs. Arnold Toynbee 
(1968:131), however, denounces the use of pass away and pass on as 
symptomatic of western man’s loss of belief in human dignity, a view 
which implies sympathy with the backlash against euphemism 
surrounding death which has been a feature of the post-Victorian age, 
discussed in the following chapter.
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APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 3
This survey was designed to complement the material extrapolated 
from the Historical Thesaurus, from which I found a number of 
lexical items in current use to be missing, a matter which will 
undoubtedly be addressed prior to its completion. The survey was 
distributed to students of English Language at Glasgow University, as 
well as to friends and associates of all ages and backgrounds.
SURVEY ON TH E LANGUAGE OF DEATH
The following words and phrases comprise the current synonyms of 
death and die drawn from the Historical Thesaurus o f English, in 
production at Glasgow University.
d e a th  (noun)
appointment in Samarra, decease, departure, end, expiry, 
quietus, thirty
d ie  (verb)
cash/pass/send in one’s checks, cop it, cross Jordan, depart 
(this life), die off, die the death, drop off, end up, expire, fall,be 
gathered to one’s fathers/people, get one’s/the call, give up 
the ghost, go, go/depart out of this world, go off/out, go/pass 
to one’s reward, go the way of all flesh, go to Glory, go West, 
hop (off), join the majority, kick off, kick the bucket, pack off,
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part, pass away, pass (hence), pass on, pass out/over, peg out, 
pop/drop/slip off (the hooks), shed (one’s own) blood, shuffle 
off, snuff it, snuff out, sough away, succumb, tine [Scots 
dialect], yield (up) the ghost/soul/breath/ life
Can you think of any words or phrases which you use or have heard 
which are missing from the lists? Please enter your suggestions on 
the back of this sheet and, if possible, indicate the sort of situation in 
which the word might be used.
Exam ple: ‘snuff it’, this would be used in a situation where the 
speaker is not closely involved with anyone’s death, and perhaps 
intends to be humorous.
Please note: there are no ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ answers, just think about 
what you actually say or hear.
Thank you!
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Chapter 4 
PERCEPTIONS OF DEATH
One cannot look directly at the sun or at death.1 
Introduction
This thesis holds that language is both a system with inbuilt strategies 
for change and regulation, and a social phenomenon, conditioned by 
our perception of the world.
LANGUAGE WORLD
This simple diagram is intended to show that the mind perceives the 
world2, and that perception of the world affects the way the mind 
thinks. The mind constructs language, and language affects our 
perceptions, and there is, therefore, a connection between how we 
perceive the world and the language we use to discuss it. The Sapir- 
Whorf hypothesis (see p. 13) emphasises the point that language helps 
to structure the way we think. Lyons {Language, Meaning and 
Context, 1981:68) writes:
JLa Rouchefoucauld (1957: 410)
2 The philosophical question o f whether perception o f the world is direct 
or indirect is outside the scope o f this thesis.
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...what we think of the world, or reality, is very largely the 
product of the categories imposed upon the mush of experience and 
the amorphous flow of thought by the languages we happen to 
speak.
The connection between perception and language is demonstrated, for 
example, by the actuation of metaphor, whereby the mind makes a 
link between its perception of two things in the world - A and B - and 
uses language to structure discussion of A in terms of B. It might 
then become usual to talk about A in terms of B, as has happened, for 
example, with the concept ‘death* structured by the concept ‘journey* 
throughout the history of English. There have, however, been 
significant changes, as well as areas of continuity, in our perceptions 
of death, and in this chapter I will discuss these changes and suggest 
correlations with the development of the semantic field ‘Death*. 
Binski (1996:164) writes:
Death, like birth, is of course universal, but the state of death can 
only be represented or written about from the perspective of the 
cultural experiences of the living.
I concentrate in other chapters on the development of the language 
surrounding death, and, in this chapter, I would like to briefly assess 
the development of perceptions of death, in an attempt to discover 
correlations between the two. I refer throughout to historical and 
anthropological material of which I can claim to have no special 
knowledge. The arguments presented are, however, uncontroversial 
according to the prominent writers in the relevant fields.
The historian John McManners (1981:3) comments that material 
dealing with perceptions of death in western history has only recently 
begun to be produced. He attributes this to the taboo surrounding the 
investigation of death in western culture. The notion of a ‘taboo’, in 
the anthropological sense of the word, surrounding death may be
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slightly exaggerated (see also pp.35-36). It may have simply been the 
case that the way of death in the west was not deemed a subject of 
interest by academics, compared with the burial rituals and 
eschatological beliefs of non-westerners. The fact remains, however, 
that scholars have only recently begun to investigate the ways in 
which our lives in the west are, and have been, affected by the facts of 
death, and many (for example, Becker, (1973), Barley (1995) Brain 
(1979) and Hinton (1980)) comment on the existence of a taboo. 
Geoffrey Gorer (1965) is generally credited with first challenging the 
taboo in his article The Pornography o f Death (first published in 
1955), whose title refers to the way in which death has arguably 
become more heavily tabooed than sex in the modem age. Gorer 
argues that, whereas in the Victorian age, sex was a forbidden subject 
while death was freely spoken and written about, in the twentieth 
century, we deny the reality of death but are obsessed with all things 
sexual. This argument highlights the fact that there have been 
changes in the way in which death has been perceived throughout 
history.
I will not attempt in this thesis to reproduce the evidence provided for 
the statements about past attitudes to death. Most writers affirm the 
difficulty of discerning the truth about how people in the distant past 
viewed the prospect of their own death and that of others. But the 
evidence used - which includes literature of all kinds such as wills and 
ecclesiastical documents, as well as tomb sculpture and paintings - 
offers an account which is unified and at the same time highlights the 
differences between progressive generations throughout the centuries. 
Our investigation begins in the Middle Ages, looking at medieval 
eschatology and perceptions of death.
The Middle Ages
The people of the medieval period were more familiar with death 
than ourselves for a number of reasons. Life expectancy was far 
lower - no more than 5% of the population achieved the age of 60 - 
and infant and child mortality in particular were very high. As a
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result, babies were usually baptised on the day of their birth and were 
often named after an older sibling since only one at best would be 
expected to reach adulthood. The occurrence of dramatic, 
widespread death, no longer experienced in Britain today, was not 
uncommon; in times of famine and disease whole families could quite 
suddenly be wiped out. Moreover, we should bear in mind that, since 
death and dying were not institutionalised as they are now, people 
witnessed the process of dying in their own homes. A development of 
the early Middle Ages which indicates, perhaps, a greater acceptance 
of death during this period was that, since the eighth century, the dead 
had no longer been banished to extramural cemetries but were buried 
close to the living, often inside churches. Aries (1974:14) comments 
on this development:
...the co-existence of the living and the dead [...] is a new and 
surprising phenomenon, unknown in pagan antiquity and even in 
early Christianity. And it has been completely alien to us since the 
late eighteenth century.
For the people of the early Middle Ages, the event of supreme 
importance in the eschatological system was the Second Coming of 
Christ, which involved the general resurrection of the dead. It was 
believed that, at the time of death, the soul entered a period of waiting 
with all the other souls of the dead for this event. Initially there was 
no mention of judgement being passed on the individual - resurrection 
was a collective, corporate event. Gradually, the Second Coming 
came to be associated with the Last Judgement, at which each 
individual soul would be judged separately. In 1274 the doctrine of 
purgatory was included in the profession of faith, and prayers for the 
dead became more meaningful and urgent because it was believed that 
intercession could reduce the length of time a soul spent in purgatory.
Throughout the Middle Ages, beginning around the 12th century, the 
emphasis moved away from collective judgement, and the decisive 
event became the death of the individual. Whereas earlier 
eschatology had maintained a balance between individual and
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corporate expectations of the after-life, attention was now 
concentrated on the individual's hope of salvation, if necessary after a 
period in purgatory. The theme of general resurrection became 
secondary to the question of the destiny of the individual. The 
doctrine of purgatory was discarded during the 16th century at the 
Reformation, but there was no return to the belief in collective 
judgement, and no longer any assurance of a waiting period during 
which the future of one’s soul might be negotiated.
Gittings (1984:19-20) lists three principles which have been 
consistently noted in studies of death in so-called ‘primitive’ societies 
and are highly evident in medieval attitudes to death, continuing to 
some extent until the time of the Reformation3.
1) B urial is not a contem poraneous fact. Late medieval 
burial services and ceremonies were often repeated for years after 
a person's death. Interment was, obviously, clearly pinpointed in 
time but burial ritual often had a long time span.
2) Physical death  is not the m om ent of suprem e 
significance. In early medieval eschatology, bodily death played 
a subsidiary role - throughout the Middle Ages there was a strong 
belief in continuity between the states of being alive and being 
dead. But more attention came to be focused on the moment of 
death as the point at which the soul would initially be judged. The 
belief in purgatory, which continued unofficially until well after 
the Reformation, served as a sort of halfway stage whereby the 
moment of death was accorded increasingly more, but not supreme 
significance, since salvation was possible after a period in 
purgatory.
3) The behaviour of the living is linked to the state of the 
dead. The doctrine of purgatory ensured that the living and the 
dead were bound by ritual ties. The living could, and were often 
obliged and even paid to, attempt to shorten the time which the
3 In order to conserve space I have summarised and explained these 
princip les m yself.
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dead would spend in purgatory through prayers of intercession.
The medieval funeral, as one would expect, reflected the beliefs of the 
time. The dual function of the funeral rite involved, on the one hand, 
the eschatological element of commending the soul of the deceased to 
God, and on the other, the social element of keeping his/her memory 
alive. Lavish, expensive funerals became increasingly popular for 
members of the upper classes throughout the Middle Ages, and in 
these cases the interment of the body would often take place weeks 
after death, without the same degree of ceremony as the three or four 
preceding ceremonies. There were different views on the appropriate 
length of time before interment, however, and some testators 
expressed in their wills a desire to be buried as soon as possible after 
the moment of death, so that intercession for their soul could begin 
immediately and in earnest. The desire of others to wait for at least a 
few days was probably partly motivated by the fear of being buried 
alive - a common mishap in those days of relatively unsophisticated 
medical knowledge.
Boase (1972:44-45) discusses the medieval belief that those who 
enjoyed an easy life on earth would suffer the exact opposite in the 
afterlife, and attributes its popularity to the harshness of medieval 
life, especially, but not exclusively, for the poor. He argues that the 
brutality and injustices inherent in medieval life ensured that the 
people of this period were more accustomed to, and accepting of, the 
physical reality of death than those of the modem period. His 
argument is supported, for example, by the language of medieval 
memorials which lack the tenderness that we would expect today, and 
never lapse into the sentimentality favoured in Victorian times. He 
provides evidence to show that medieval art in general can be seen as 
confronting mortality in a variety of ways, but always with a lack of 
sentimentality and a sense of basic resignation to death, an event 
believed to proceed from a divine justice which stood beyond 
question.
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There has been a tendency, criticised by writers such as Gittings 
(1984:15), to see the Middle Ages as a sort of ‘golden age’ of death 
based on the premise that familiarity with death breeds indifference to 
it. There is, however, no reason to believe that familiarity with, and 
even resignation to, death results in a lack of concern over it. 
McManners (1981:64) writes:
Yet were people really unconcerned, did their evasions and 
euphemisms avail them, was their apparent callousness anything 
more than a shield against unbearable pain, a conformity to a 
convention? The losses that are more frequent and the losses that 
are expected are not thereby easier to bear.
Another misguided view is that people of the late medieval period in 
particular were obsessed with death, a view which seems chiefly to be 
based on the artistic taste of the time. Representations of the ‘Dance 
of Death’, for example, were popular and tomb sculpture became 
increasingly realistic and exaggerated throughout the Middle Ages, 
until maggot-infested, half decomposed bodies, or ‘transi’, were 
commonly seen adorning tombs. The people of this period clearly 
rblished graphic representations of death which we would tend to find 
macabre or distasteful considering the contexts in which they appear, 
but Gittings (1984:35) remarks that, although these objects indicate a 
growing concern with death, it is surprising, considering the ravages 
of the Black Death in the late fourteenth century, that there is no 
evidence of much greater anxiety and despair. Art of this nature, 
often intentionally humorous in its depiction of death personified and 
physical decompostition, might be understood as a result of the need 
to come to terms with the destructive power of death.
In the fifteenth century books on the ‘Art of Dying’ began to appear. 
They often expressed the view that death could actually be postponed 
by good intentions, but their main purpose was as guides for an 
honourable death after the completion of earthly duties. The 
popularity of these books attests, once again, to the growing concern 
with death during the Middle Ages.
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Changing perceptions: causes
One of the earliest and most prominent writers on the subject of 
changing perceptions of death was Philippe Aries (1974, 1981).
Aries first formulated the argument that the growth of individualism 
throughout the Middle Ages made death increasingly difficult to come 
to terms with, culminating in the ‘death-denying’ stance of the 
modern era. Aries' pioneering work has been criticised for its 
generalisations and assumptions, including its tendency to romanticise 
the ‘familiar and accepted’ death of the past as opposed to the 
‘fearsome and unmentionable death’ of the present. However, his 
tying of growing individualism to growing anxiety over death was 
taken up by Clare Gittings (1984) and the argument was greatly 
improved.
Gittings (1984:9-10) claims that in the last five centuries, the 
emphasis on the separateness of each person, rather than on the shared 
aspects of humanity, has grown. That there has been a gradual 
increase in individualism in the western world is an acceptable 
assertion. Certainly, in the modern age, the liberty of the individual 
has become the cornerstone of western political thought and practice. 
Gittings argues that, in a scheme where the uniqueness of the 
individual is stressed, death is seen as more of a crisis, since a unique 
individual can never be replaced. She provides a great deal of 
evidence for the growing anxiety over death and its concealment 
which has taken place. Developments around the late medieval/early 
modern period include the creation of graveyards, the widespread 
coffining or embalming of bodies, the institutionalization of death and 
the creation of the undertaking profession. She points to the growing 
emphasis in literature on the difference between the soul and the body 
and the states of life and death throughout the medieval period. Also, 
the preaching of funeral sermons, heraldic funerals, erection of tombs
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Gittings' (1984) argument is convincing, but she has been criticised 
for exaggerating the importance of the growth of individualism in the 
development of our so-called ‘death-denying’ modem view. Other 
writers stress the undeniable influence of events like the Reformation 
in influencing attitudes, although it could well be argued that the 
Reformation was itself a result of growing individualism. Gittings 
(1984) argues that religious and doctrinal changes have little effect on 
people's reaction to death and that it has been feelings of loss due to a 
heightened sense of the uniqueness of individuals, rather than concepts 
of the after-life that have shaped responses. For the purposes of this 
thesis, I will accept that a growing sense of individualism, combined 
with a number of other events and trends, including the growing 
emphasis on the small nuclear family, changes in life expectancy, 
emergence of a more secular climate of opinion, etc. have led to our 
modern perception of death.
The effect of the Reformation was to remove the buffer of purgatory 
from the eschatological system - a development which must certainly 
have had a substantial impact on perceptions of death (although there 
is evidence that belief in purgatory continued, especially in relatively 
isolated areas, for at least a century afterwards). The effect of this 
loss can confidently be supposed to have been an increase in anxiety 
about death, since the majority of people - neither very good nor very 
wicked - who would formerly have expected a period in purgatory 
prior to salvation, would now face judgement which would damn or 
save their souls, and they would face it alone, without the possibility 
of intercession on their behalf. The Reformation made the dividing 
line between life and death much sharper; death was now the decisive 
moment. Also, the funeral ritual was stripped of its eschatological 
purpose - there was no longer any need for the dying person to be 
involved in his/her funeral preparations (a common practice before 
the Reformation) since it could not benefit his/her soul anyway. The 
ritual ties connecting the living and the dead, as mentioned in point 3) 
above, were, at least in theory, severed. The secularism of the 
funeral reached a peak in the sixteenth century, particularly for the
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nobility, for whom its primary function came to be the affirming of 
the social standing of the heirs and associates of the deceased.
The principles mentioned in 1) and 2) above - that burial is not a 
contemporaneous fact and that physical death is not the moment of 
supreme significance - have also ceased to be true. The moment of 
physical death is seen today as the point at which the individual is 
irretrievably lost, and the burial ritual has been invested with the 
whole of the ceremonial significance of marking the loss of that 
individual from society, since there are no prior or subsequent 
ceremonies.
Gittings (1984:20) claims that the loss of beliefs 1), 2) and 3) mark 
the increase in anxiety aroused by death. I find the claim convincing 
that without these beliefs death is more traumatic, since burial 
consitutes a much sharper separation, and comfort can no longer be 
drawn from the ritual ties between the living and the dead. A society 
which holds these beliefs would therefore tend to find death less 
anxiety-provoking than one which does not. The situation might 
perhaps be more complex, however, since individuals and societies 
tend to develop strategies for coping with crises which cannot easily 
be measured against one another.
It is perhaps dangerous, given the limitations of this enquiry, to speak 
of the people of one point in time suffering more anxiety over death 
than those of another, as if ‘anxiety’ is a measurable entity. As John 
McManners (1981:62) remarks, in his exploration of 18th century 
French attitudes:
The oversimplified question, ‘Did they fear death more than we 
do?’ is impossible to answer. [...] what measurements can we devise 
to classify fear?
There is evidence, for example, that in times of famine and disease 
epidemics a ‘panic threshold’ might be crossed whereby people
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There is evidence, for example, that in times of famine and disease 
epidemics a ‘panic threshold’ might be crossed whereby people 
become incapable of investing the usual degree of emotion in the 
deaths around them. McManners (1981:62) writes:
That familiarity breeds contempt can hardly be postulated of death, 
so far as our own final dissolution is concerned, but it may breed 
callousness to the deaths of others. ‘No one wept for the dead,’ said 
the fourteenth-century chronicler of the plague in Sienna, ‘because 
everyone expected to die himself.’
The same apparent callousness has resulted in some cases from the 
over-exposure to death suffered by soldiers of recent wars, and, as 
McManners argues it should not be taken to indicate indifference to 
death. The majority of writers (Ari£s (1974, 1981),Clarkson (1975), 
Gittings (1984, 1992) and Gorer (1965)), however, find that, for 
example, the greater degree of comfort provided by the 
eschatological beliefs of the Middle Ages would mitigate to some 
extent the anxiety aroused by death. Laurence (1989:76), writing 
about attitudes towards death in 17th century England, writes:
...it seems probable that people in the seventeenth-century did not 
grieve less than they do now, their relationships were not less 
intense, but, because death was a much more everyday occurrence, 
they were better prepared for it. They knew better how to invoke 
the resignation which is an important part of accepting death.
A number of writers, including Clarkson (1975), have discussed the 
influence of demographic transition on how people viewed death. 
Since the 18th century the population of England has steadily 
increased due to changes in the material environment, better food, 
clothing, and a housed population who are more resistant to diseases 
which the medical profession has become capable of curing or 
eradicating entirely. These developments have changed the way that 
death imposes on life, and it has to some extent become possible 
(except in periods of war) to live life untouched by death.
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The Victorian era is the next period of interest in this brief history of 
perceptions of death. According to Gittings (1984:16) its aberrance, 
in terms of the general development of society's attitudes to death, is a 
result of the Victorians' attempt to ‘turn back the clock’ apparent in 
many aspects of their culture. Death in the Victorian period was 
invested with a religious fervour, which had as its unsound 
theological foundation a combination of the ‘golden age’ of medieval 
England and Puritan ideas. This led to the sort of sentimentality 
which is typical of the Victorian arts. The failure of the Victorians to 
rekindle ‘medieval’ religious zeal is attributed by Gittings (1984:16) 
to the intermittent emergence of individualism which made it 
impossible to face one's own death without anxiety and the death of 
loved ones without terrible sorrow. I mentioned above that she omits 
other factors which have contributed to responses to death. 
Nevertheless, it appears that the comparative resignation to death 
which the Victorians attempted to recapture had begun to evaporate 
during the late Middle Ages.
The Victorians should perhaps, in contradiction to Gorer's 
(1965:171) assertion that they celebrated death, be more accurately 
viewed as attempting to deny the reality of death. According to 
David Cannadine (1981:187) the historical picture whereby death in 
the Victorian era is seen as relatively easy compared to the trauma of 
death in the present day, may be mistaken. The modem ‘denial of 
death’ differs in that it is essentially hidden, but the Victorians 
wallowed in death until it ceased to have any true meaning. The 
assumption that ostentatious ceremony eases the prospect of death for 
the dying and grief for the survivors is unproved. He argues 
(1981:189-195) that contemporary bereavement is no more difficult 
to endure now than in the Victorian age because we view death in the 
present with more honesty than in the ‘death-denying’ Victorian era.
Graveyard euphemisms as well as much of the literature of the period
The Victorian period
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demonstrate this desire to create a new reality. A particularly 
striking tendency is the frequently expressed sentiment in children's 
literature that death is to be wished for and that those who die as 
children are lucky. Yudkin (1968:50) observes:
Can we imagine anyone today composing this Hymn fo r  Infant 
Mindsl
CHILD
Tell me, mamma, if I must die 
One day, as little baby died;
And look so very pale, and lie 
Down in the pit-hole by his side?
MAMMA 
[verse omitted]
These hands, and feet, and busy head,
Shall waste and crumble right away;
But though your body shall be dead,
There is a part which can’t decay.
The Victorian denial of death led to the development of interest in 
spiritualism - a means by which the finality of death could be 
diminished through contact with the ‘other side’. Garland (1989:162) 
writes:
Christian spiritualists [...] seemed confident, [...] for whether 
through their old religious beliefs or because of their 
communications with the spirits of the departed, their hope for 
personal immortality was reinforced.
The 20th century
We would expect the attitude towards death in the twentieth century
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The 20th century
We would expect the attitude towards death in the twentieth century 
western world to have been shaped by the devastation of the world 
wars. David Cannadine (1981:189) argues that the impact of World 
War I on attitudes to death has been underrated by academics - its 
significance, he claims, was profound for at least a generation, and 
interwar Britain was probably more obsessed with death than at any 
other time in the modem era. This seems convincing given the level 
of exposure of combatants to death and the fact that almost every 
family in Britain suffered at least one untimely bereavement during 
the same short space of time. Cannadine (1981:197) writes:
‘Men of whatever age’, Harold Macmillan recalls, ‘are not often 
confronted with death - certainly not violent death. Now we lived 
with death, day by day.’
Cannadine (1981:193-194) argues with Aries' (1974, 1981) 
chronology of changes in modem attitudes. He distinguishes between 
the ‘celebration of death’ which was on the wane from the 1880s and 
the ‘glorification of death’ which was markedly on the increase from 
around that time. The ‘denial of death’ assumed by Aries to date 
from around 1945, was well underway by 1914, although death in 
battle was still thought worthy of glorification. Interestingly, he 
provides evidence to show that many cultural commentators of the 
time saw this tendency of ‘denying’ death as an improvement 
compared to the ‘morbid’ fascination exhibited in the Victorian era.
The losses of World War I were rendered more difficult to bear, 
according to Cannadine (1981:196), by the huge drop in the death 
rate of young people over the previous decades. The war shattered 
recently developed attitudes formed to some extent by expectations of 
long life. The church seemed unable to cope with so much mortality 
and grief and suffered from an unprecedented drop in congregations 
from which it has never recovered.
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people were perhaps relieved that the casualties were nowhere near as 
large as in the first war, and comforted by the belief that this was a 
far more worthwhile war. There seems also to be a sentiment 
running through the expressed attitudes of the time that the pre-1914 
innocence had been lost for good and that death in World War II had 
not the same power to shock as that in World War I.
The second half of the twentieth century has seen further 
developments which have resulted in death taking on a more global 
aspect than ever before. The creation of the atomic bomb has meant 
that, for the first time in history, gobal death has become a 
possibility. The considerable anxiety that this realisation first aroused 
has, however, subsided since the end of the Cold War.
In the present day, the contemplation of death can be terrifying, 
chiefly as a result of the lack of belief in resurrection and the after­
life (beliefs which are often, unsurprisingly, embraced by those 
facing death or suffering bereavement). A common modern cause of 
anxiety is the perceived loneliness of death, stemming perhaps from 
demographic changes and changes in the family structure, as well as 
from our desire to push death to the fringes of our experience so that 
it has minimum visibility and affect upon our lives.
Conclusions
In the light of the above, we would appear to be justified in 
concluding that the general perception of death has undergone 
significant changes during the period in question. Death, for reasons 
which include the growth of individualism and changes in the 
eschatological system of beliefs, appears to be more anxiety- 
provoking now than formerly. We must bear in mind, however,.that 
we know little about personal perspectives on death from the distant 
past and that comparison is therefore difficult.
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Linguistic correlations
This chapter has been concerned with changes in the conceptual area 
‘death’ which is covered by the semantic field ‘Death’. At the 
beginning of the chapter (p.63), appeared the claim that a language is 
conditioned by the perceptions of those who speak it. The following 
points are suggested as ways in which changing perceptions of death 
are reflected in the language.
1) It has been a basic assertion of this thesis that areas of human 
experience which arouse anxiety are surrounded by euphemistic 
language. Death, throughout the history of English, has been a 
major cause of concern and there has been a continuous supply of 
euphemistic language with which to discuss it.
2) We saw in chapter 3 (p.75) that a number of metaphors dealing 
with the destructive nature of death appear only in OE. Metaphors 
based on the physical act of dying have emerged again in PDE but 
these tend to be restricted to contexts in which their use is clearly 
dysphemistic whereas the OE metaphors are contextually 
euphemistic. The ability of our medieval ancestors to employ such 
metaphors euphemistically might reflect the view put forward by 
Boase (1972: 44-45) that they had a greater tolerance than 
ourselves for the ‘gory details’ of death (see also p. 109).
3) We found that the Victorians tended to wallow in the sentiment 
of death but that this perhaps resulted from a desire to deny the 
reality of death. The language which entered the semantic field 
‘Death’ during the 19th century appears to reflect both the desire to 
prettify death (go to glory, succumb), and the growing need to 
diminish it (turn one's toes up, croak, snuff it).
4) We saw in chapter 2 that dysphemism performs the function of 
enabling discussion of death which is evasive without the solemnity 
of euphemistic language. In chapter 3 we found that the semantic 
field ‘Death’ in PDE is more highly dysphemistic than ever before. 
In this chapter we have encountered a number of developments,
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which might have encouraged this increase in dysphemistic 
language, such as:
a) increase in anxiety over death (due to changes in 
eschatological beliefs, increased institutionalising of death, etc.) 
resulting in an increased desire to distance ourselves from it.
b) lack of familiarity with death and rise in life-expentancy 
contributing to our ability to distance ourselves from death, 
often by means of humour.
5) I mentioned in the introduction (p.i) that the semantic field 
‘Death* as classified by the Historical Thesaurus is relatively self- 
contained, that is, there is little overlapping of the meanings within 
it with those of other semantic fields, by comparison with the 
overlapping between most other fields. In chapter 3 (p.95-96) I 
argued that ambiguity of forms is unlikely to be tolerated for long 
in this area of the language. I believe that this increased limitation 
of ambiguity and polysemy arises as a result of our perception of 
death as a particularly separate and unique experience, and from 
our desire that it should remain so.
6) In chapter 2 (p.53) it was observed that the semantic field 
‘Death* is the only field surrounding a taboo area which is not 
productive of ‘swear’ words. I would suggest that this, as in point
5) above, reflects our perception of death as a highly singular and 
particularly anxiety-provoking concept.
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Chapter 5 
CONCLUSIONS
This short chapter will draw together the main points expressed in 
this thesis:
1) I have provided a description of semantic theory which provides 
a framework for the diachronic investigation of semantic fields.
2) I have explored the influence of taboo on the vocabulary and 
demonstrated its connection with euphemism and dysphemism.
3) I have developed a comprehensive theory of euphemism, and 
shown that dysphemistic language is not distinct from, but closely 
related to, euphemism.
4) Analysis of metaphor in synonyms for ‘death’ and ‘die’ revealed 
significant continuity from OE to PDE. Otherwise, the appearance 
and disappearance of particular metaphors at particular times 
seemed to reflect changing perceptions of death.
5) Comparison of synonyms for ‘death’ and ‘die’ in 1400 and in 
1950 demonstrated that this area of the language has become 
increasingly dysphemistic.
6) I have argued that this area of the language has been shaped at 
least to some extent by changing perceptions of death.
Implications for further study
The investigation of the semantic field ‘Death’ presented in this thesis 
is, of necessity, limited in its scope. The following points are 
suggested as ways in which study in this area might proceed:
1) A comparative study of the field ‘Death’ in English with the
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same semantic field of a non-Indo-European language. This might 
reveal more clearly the ways in which a semantic field is structured 
by the conceptual system of the speakers of the language of which it 
is a part.
2) A study of the semantic fields covering other taboo areas of the 
English language. Such an investigation might show whether the 
language surrounding taboo concepts other than ‘death’ have 
developed in a similar way, particularly as regards the increase in 
dysphemism.
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